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A new world is slouching toward New York and London, Beijing 
and Bangkok, to be born.1 If our planet and our values survive the 
* Benno C. Schmidt Chair of Business Law, The University of Texas School of Law. 
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academic, I have appeared as a witness and as counsel in a number of multinational bank­
ruptcy proceedings in the United States and abroad. I have been employed on behalf of 
both debtors and creditors and both United States and foreign parties, so I do not believe my 
experience has produced any systematic bias. 
I received some very helpful comments from Kenneth Klee, Ronald Mann, and Bruce 
Markell. I am especially grateful to my co-author Elizabeth Warren for her insights. As al­
ways, the staff of the Tarleton Law Library, especially John Pratter, have been invaluable. I 
have benefited from the excellent research assistance of Ryan Bull and Majid Yazdi, both 
Texas 2000. In addition, I want to express my gratitude to my former dean, Mark Yudof, for 
having opened the door of opportunity into the international insolvency field. Any missteps 
are despite all this help. 
1. Our prospects have become more mixed since Yeats wrote THE SECOND COMING 
(1921). 
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secondary effects of that emergence, we may look forward to a hu­
manity more prosperous and more integrated than at any time in hu­
man history. The force that drives us to that future is free-market 
capitalism constrained in the vessel of democratic institutions. One 
important element in its progress is the fashioning of an international 
system for managing the financial crises that are one of the free mar­
ket's inevitable consequences. In this symposium, we debate which is 
the best such system we can devise. 
The argument of this contribution to the symposium can be sum­
marized as follows: 
a) Universalism - administration of multinational insolvencies by 
a leading court applying a single bankruptcy law - is necessarily the 
correct long-term solution. Bankruptcy is one of those laws that can­
not perform its function unless it is symmetrical to the market in which 
it operates. Virtually all theorists share this view and it is reflected in 
the nearly unanimous practice of nations, including the United States. 
The only substantive objection is that universalism would too greatly 
submerge national policies, but experience in the United States and 
elsewhere demonstrates that a national, market-symmetrical law can 
largely accommodate local policies. In the same way, an international 
system could permit considerable play to varying national policies and 
could enforce them more effectively against multinationals. 
b) The primary objection to universalism is political. It is argued 
that universalism is unlikely to be achieved in the foreseeable future. 
Although political predictions are difficult, it is evident that globaliza­
tion is producing enormous pressures for legal convergence and those 
pressures are most likely to prevail as to laws that require market­
symmetry to be successful. Many of the obstacles to universalism are 
also obstacles to coordination and harmonization in antitrust, securi­
ties laws, and other business laws. Solutions in each area will feed so­
lutions in the others if globalization continues. 
c) Contractualism as an alternative to universalism is not workable 
domestically or internationally unless it is based on a system of domi­
nant security interests. The theoretical benefits of such a system re­
main highly controversial and its prospects for international adoption 
are bleak. 
d) The most difficult problem is fashioning an interim solution 
pending movement to true universalism. "Modified universalism," as 
proposed in the American Law Institute Transnational Insolvency 
Project, is the best answer because its pragmatic flexibility provides 
the best fit with the problem presented by the current patchwork of 
laws in the global market, and because it will foster the smoothest and 
fastest transition to true universalism. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
The symposium has arisen on a wave of bankruptcy reform that is 
sweeping around the world. The reform movement addresses both 
domestic and international bankruptcy laws, and is powerfully sup­
ported by initiatives from the International Monetary Fund2 and the 
World Bank.3 Legislatures in Bonn,4 Buenos Aires,5 Canberra,6 
Ottawa,7 and Tokyo8 have rewritten their bankruptcy laws in the last 
decade, as have Russia and China (twice each) and most of Eastern 
Europe.9 New bankruptcy laws have also appeared in Singapore, 
Indonesia, and Thailand.10 The wave has not crested. In addition to 
the promise of further reform in Tokyo, the British government has 
introduced a bill substantially revising the Insolvency Act of 1986, 11 the 
Mexican Congress has adopted a measure completely rewriting La Ley 
2 See LEGAL DEPT., INT'L MONETARY ORDERLY FuND, & EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY 
PROCEDURAL PRINCIPLES: KEY ISSUES {1999) [hereinafter IMF Report]. 
3. See World Bank Initiative, <http://wwwl.worldbank.org/legaUinsolvency_in/overview. 
htm>. 
4. lnsolvenzordnung [Insolvency Law], art. 102, reprinted in GesetzesbeschluB des 
Deutschen Bundestages, Drucksache 12/2443, April 21, 1994. The German law was adopted 
in 1994, but did not become effective until 1999. See Klaus Kamiah, The New German Insol­
vency Act: Insolvenzordnung, 70 AM. BANKR. LJ. 417 (1996). 
5. Juan M. Dobson, Argentina's Bankruptcy Law of 1995, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 101 (1998) 
(Symposium on International Bankruptcy Law: Comparative and Transnational Ap­
proaches). 
6. Corporations Act, 1989, ch. 5, div. 9, sec. 581, (Aust!.), amended by Corporate Law 
Reform Act, 1992. 
7. AM. LAW INST., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL 
STATEMENT OF CANADIAN BANKRUPTCY LAW 5 (Tentative Draft April 15, 1997) (finally 
approved and awaiting translation) [hereinafter Canadian Statement]. 
8. Minjisaiseiho [Debtor rehabilitation law], Law No. 225 of 1999 (Effective April 1, 
2000). See Junichi Matsushita, UNCITRAL Model Law and the Comprehensive Reform of 
Japanese Insolvency, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF GLOBALIZATION 151 (2000). 
9. China: Supplementary Notices on Issues Concerning the Trial Implementation in 
Several Cities of State-Owned Enterprise Bankruptcy and Reemployment of Staff and 
Workers, March 2, 1997; People's Republic of China Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, enacted 
December 2, 1986, effective November 1, 1988. Russia: The Law of the Russian Federation, 
"On Insolvency (Bankruptcy), #6 - FZ of 8th Jan., 1998, effective March 1, 1998, replacing 
Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy, effective March 1, 1993. Eastern Europe: Richard D. 
Coates and Arlene Elgart Mirsky, Restructuring and Bankruptcy in Central and Eastern 
Europe; Pamela Bickford Sak and Henry N. Schiffman, Bankruptcy Law Reform In Eastern 
Europe, 28 INT'L LAW. 927 (1994). 
10. See OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE & PUBLIC TRUSTEE OFFICE OF SINGAPORE, A GUIDE TO 
THE NEW BANKRUPTCY ACT 1995, issued by the Official Assignee & Public Trustee Office 
of Singapore; Andrew Chan Chi Yin, The Singapore Bankruptcy Act 1995, 1 ASIAN COM. L. 
REV. 40-45 (1996); Tanya Senn, The New Bankruptcy Law in Thailand, 3 ASIAN COM. L. 
REV. 50 (1998); Stacey Steele, The New Law on Bankruptcy in Indonesia: Towards a Mod­
ern Corporate Bankruptcy Regime?, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 144 (1999). 
11. Insolvency Bill [H.L.], available at <http://www.parliament.thestationer.uk>. 
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de Quiebras Y Suspension de Pagos,12 and many other ministries are 
well along with reform measures.13 These domestic reforms have in­
cluded, in every instance, substantial examination of other countries' 
laws and reform proposals, so they rest upon an emerging interna­
tional oeuvre of reform.14 
The domestic reform movements are matched by the burgeoning 
interest in transnational bankruptcy (or insolvency),15 which we may 
define as the management of the general financial default of a multina­
tional enterprise. The wave of reform at the international level dem­
onstrates that the international community has a willingness and an 
ability to achieve reform in the field of multinational insolvency that is 
of obvious relevance to the present discussion. While the current re­
forms are only first steps, they go well beyond what most observers 
would have predicted just five years ago. In addition to the IMF and 
World Bank initiatives, the United Nations Commission on Interna­
tional Trade Laws ("UNCITRAL") has promulgated a Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency (the "Model Law").16 The Model Law does 
not adopt substantive bankruptcy rules, but rather, provides a system 
of cooperation among the courts having jurisdiction over aspects of 
the assets and affairs of a multinational enterprise in financial dis­
tress.17 In many civil law countries, its adoption will provide an essen-
12 See Ley de Concursos Mercantiles y de reforma al articulo 88 de la Ley Organica del 
Poder Judicial la Federaci6n, DIARIO OFICIAL, May 12, 2000, at 10. 
13. New Zealand is one of many examples. See, e.g., New Zealand Ministry of Eco­
nomic Development, Business Law: Major Projects, available at <http://www.med.govt.nz/ 
buslt/bus_pollbus_law/bus_Iaw_projects.html> (discussing New Zealand government's re­
view of possible insolvency policy developments). 
14. For example, the British government has sent questionnaires to experts around the 
world. See THE INSOLVENCY SERVICE, DEPT. OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, A REVIEW OF 
COMPANY REsCUE AND BUSINESS RECONSTRUCTION MECHANISMS (1999) (United King­
dom, seeking co=ents on proposed insolvency legislation) [hereinafter British Review]. 
See generally IMF Report, supra note 2. 
15. "Bankruptcy" or "insolvency" law governs collective proceedings for the adjustment or 
collection of debts on behalf of all creditors and other interested parties. It excludes actions 
by a creditor or particular group of creditors to collect specific debts only, as with proceed­
ings to seize and sell particular assets or to garnish debts . . . . In worldwide English­
language usage, "insolvency" is perhaps the more common term for such proceedings where 
a business debtor is involved, but in North America "bankruptcy" is at least as often used for 
business proceedings as well as those involving consumers. 
AM. LAW INST., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT, PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION IN 
TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES AMONG MEMBERS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENT at 1 n.2 (Tentative Draft, Apr. 14, 2000) (final approval, May 16, 2000; 
forthcoming) [hereinafter ALI Statement]. In this article, the terms are used interchangea­
bly. 
16. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER 
INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, U.N. SALES No. E.99.V.3 [hereinafter MODEL 
LAW]; United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 30th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/442 (1997) [hereinafter Guide to UNCITRAL Model Law], reprinted in 6 TUL. J. 
INT'L & COMP. L. 415, 439 (1998). 
17. Guide to UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 16, at 1.3. 
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tial legislative direction permitting courts to cooperate with courts in 
other countries to manage multinational bankruptcies. In most 
adopting countries, it is likely to make cooperation in reorganization 
cases much easier, while frustrating efforts to engage in manipulation 
of assets and other fraudulent activity.18 The Model Law has been 
fashioned into a new Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code, and has been contained in every version of the pending bank­
ruptcy legislation in both houses.19 The basic principles of the Model 
Law are included in the new Japanese law2° and its substance is part of 
the bankruptcy legislation adopted in Mexico.21 The government bill 
in Britain provides for its adoption there.22 It is under active consid­
eration in a number of other countries, including New Zealand.23 
On a regional level, the countries of the European Union have ne­
gotiated a treaty providing for even closer coordination of transna­
tional bankruptcies than the Model Law.24 For a variety of reasons, it 
is now being adopted as a "regulation" and will be effective for all 
members except Denmark in May, 2002.25 In North America, the ini­
tiative has come from the private sector in the form of the Transna­
tional Insolvency Project of the American Law Institute.26 Phase I of 
that Project produced international statements of the bankruptcy laws 
of the three NAFTA members.27 Phase II of the project culminated in 
May, 2000, with approval of a statement of principles and legislative 
18. Professor LoPucki and I disagree about the desirability of the Model Law. Compare 
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trojan Horse in UNCITRAL, 33 Bankr. Ct. Dec. {CRR) No. 25 at 
AS (Mar. 30, 1999) with Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Fearful Future Far Off, 33 Bankr. Ct. 
Dec. (CRR) No. 25 at AS {Mar. 30, 1999). 
19. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 833, 106th Congress (1999) (passed by 
the House, 5/5/1999; passed by the Senate, in lieu of S. 625, 212/2000). 
20. See Hideyuki Sakai & C. Christian Jacobson, The Japanese Bankruptcy Process En­
ters a New Era: Enactment of the Civil Rehabilitation Law, 11 NEWSLETTER OF COMM. J. 3 
{2000). 
21. See supra note 12. 
22. See supra note 11. 
23. See Mike Ross, Insolvency Law Will Help Investors, 2/18/99 NAT'L Bus. REV., Feb. 
18, 1999, available in 1999WL 12335944. 
24. See European Union: Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, Nov. 23, 1995, 35 
I.L.M. 1223 {1996) [hereinafter EU Convention]. 
25. See European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 160 (June 30, 2000) <http://Europa.eu.int/eur-lexl> [hereinafter 
EU Regulation]. 
26. I am the United States Reporter for that project. 
27. These statements have been approved by the Institute and are awaiting completion 
of translation. See Transnational Insolvency Project, International Statement of United 
States Bankruptcy Law {Tentative Draft April 15, 1997) [hereinafter U.S. Statement]; 
Transnational Insolvency Project, International Statement of Canadian Bankruptcy Law 
{Tentative Draft Apr. 15, 1997) [hereinafter Canadian Statement]; Transnational Insolvency 
Project, International Statement of Mexican Bankruptcy Law (Council Draft No.1 Dec. 1, 
1997) [hereinafter Mexican Statement]. 
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recommendations for closer cooperation in transnational bankruptcies 
among the NAFf A members.28 
Thus, the world is developing considerable experience and mo­
mentum in the field that we discuss in this symposium, and is begin­
ning to demonstrate a capacity and willingness to find international 
solutions to the problems of general default. These movements have 
received relatively little attention in the academic literature until re­
cently. I began writing and lecturing in support of universalist ap­
proaches in 1990. The ALI Project began in 1994. Professor 
Rasmussen's proposal for a contractual approach to international 
bankruptcy was published in 1997 ,29 while Professor LoPucki's critique 
of universalism was published just last year.30 Some important work 
has been done elsewhere in the last decade.31 On the whole, however, 
the subject is just emerging in the academy.32 
28. See ALI Statement, supra note 15. 
29. See Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. 
J. INT'L L. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Rasmussen, A New Approach]. 
30. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist 
Approach, 84 CORNELLL. REV. 696 (1999) [hereinafter LoPucki, Cooperation]. 
31. See, e.g., CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: COMPARATIVE DIMENSIONS, 12 UNITED 
KINGDOM COMPARATIVE LAW SERIES (Ian F. Fletcher ed., 1990); IAN F. FLETCHER, 
INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (1999) (hereinafter FLETCHER, 
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY]; PHILIP ST. J. SMART, CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, 207-
08, 248 (1991); Charles D. Booth, Recognition Of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and 
Critique of the Inconsistent Approaches Of United States Courts, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 135 
(1992); Douglas G. Boshkoff, United States Judicial Assistance in Cross-Border Insolvencies, 
36 INT. COMP. L.Q. 729 (1987); Jacob S. Ziegel, Ships at Sea, International Insolvencies, and 
Divided Courts, 29 CAN. Bus. LJ. 417 (1998); see also Harold S. Burman, Harmonization of 
International Bankruptcy Law: A United States Perspective, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543 
(1996); David C. Cook, Prospects for a North American Bankruptcy Agreement, 21 Sw. J.L. 
& Trade Am. 81 (1995). There have also been a significant number of helpful practice­
oriented articles. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL LOAN 
WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCY (1987) (hereinafter 1987 ABA]; RICHARD A. GITLIN & 
RONA R. MEARS, INTERNATIONAL LOAN WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCIES (1989); John A. 
Barrett, Various Legislative Attempts With Respect to Bankruptcies Involving More Than 
One Country, 33 TEx. INT'L L.J. 557 (1998); Evan D. Flaschen & Ronald J. Silverman, 
Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation Protocols, TEX. INT'L L.J. 587 (1998); Bruce Leonard, 
Managing Default by a Multinational Venture: Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvencies, 
TEX. INT'L LJ. 543 (1998); Daniel M. Glosband & Christopher T. Katucki, Current Devel­
opments in International Law and Practice, 45 Bus. LAW. 2273 (1990); Anne Nielson et al., 
The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat: General Principles to Facilitate the Resolution of 
Cross-Border Insolvencies, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 533, 543 (1996). 
32. There was very important work done in the past, but then the subject was neglected. 
See, e.g., Kurt H. Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy Law: Lessons Taught 
by Herstatt and Company, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1977); [hereinafter Nadelmann, Interna­
tional Bankruptcy] KURT NADELMANN, CODIFICATION OF CONFLICTS RULES FOR 
BANKRUPTCY 64-67 (1974), reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 31, 32 Before the Subcomm. on 
Civil and Constitutional Rights, 94th Cong. at 1457H. (1976); Kurt Nadelmann, Legal Treat­
ment of Foreign and Domestic Creditors, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 696, 697 (1946) 
[hereinafter Nadelmann, Legal Treatment]; Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Status of Foreign Ad­
ministrators of Insolvent Estates: A Comparative Survey, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 288 (1976). 
The standard work, although now out of print, remains 1 DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL 
INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY, PART II (1986). 
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Broadly speaking, there are three academic positions: univer­
salism, territorialism, and contractualism. The traditional positions are 
the first two.33 According to the traditional territorialist approach, 
each country would seize local assets and apply them for the benefit of 
local creditors, with little or no regard for foreign proceedings. By 
contrast, universalism is considered a system where one court adminis­
ters the bankruptcy of a debtor on a worldwide basis with the help of 
the courts in each affected country. Contractualism is an extension to 
the international level of the contractual theories of bankruptcy ad­
vanced in recent years. All three positions are represented in this 
symposium. 
The discussion that follows is divided into two parts. Part I de­
scribes the ideal international system for managing the general default 
of a multinational enterprise.34 It begins by distinguishing short-term 
transitional solutions from long-term theoretical ones. It then 
sketches the theoretical background for determining the proper scope 
of a bankruptcy law. It proceeds to describe the arguments for the 
proposition that "universalism" is the correct theoretical solution for 
the long term. Finally, it summarizes the argument that "modified 
universalism" is the better short-term solution. Part II responds to the 
positions taken in the prior articles by Professors Rasmussen and 
LoPucki, with some reference to their new articles in this symposium. 
It also comments upon Professor Guzman's article in this symposium.35 
In the process, it spells out the case for "modified universalism" as the 
best short-term transitional rule.36 
II. UNIVERSALISM 
A. A Universalist Convention 
Only in the last decade has the subject of transnational insolvency 
evolved from an interesting rarity to a distinct and important category 
33. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 10. 
34. This discussion does not include natural persons, even those in business. In that re­
gard, it follows the ALI Project. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at n.7. Bankruptcy of a 
natural person implicates a host of very difficult social problems, including domestic rela­
tions and property exemptions, that deserve a separate discussion, even in the international 
context 
35. As with any symposium, each of our papers is a moving target for the other partici­
pants, so we may assume that none of us concedes anything by silence. 
36. As with bankruptcy, the problem of multinational security interests is plagued by 
transitional difficulties. See Neil B. Cohen & Edwin E. Smith, International Secured Trans­
actions and Revised UCC Article 9, 74 CHJ:.-KENT L. REV. 1191, 1221 (1999); Ryan E. Bull, 
Note, Operation of the New Article 9 Choice Of Law Regime in an International Context, 78 
TEXAS L. REV. 679, 715 n.178 (2000) (recognizing that stark contrasts between the choice-of­
law regime in the revised Article 9 and that of most other countries may create inefficiencies 
in international secured transactions in the short and medium term). 
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in international finance and transnational litigation. In the midst of 
that development, my focus has been on short-term, pragmatic re­
sponses against the backdrop of a universalistic goal.37 Now that the 
rush to globalization is still accelerating by the rise of the internet, it is 
appropriate to approach the problem from the long view, elaborating 
the best global bankruptcy system that might be created by a multina­
tional convention on this subject.38 Professors LoPucki and 
Rasmussen have done just that, presupposing adoption of multilateral 
treaties on transnational bankruptcy. 
1. The Theoretical Background 
Although this article is not the place to address at length larger 
theories of bankruptcy, it is necessary to sketch the basic propositions 
that underlie the case for universalism. The central theoretical point is 
"market symmetry": the requirement that some systems in a legal re­
gime must be symmetrical with the market, covering all or nearly all 
transactions and stakeholders in that market with respect to the legal 
rights and duties embraced by those systems. 
Many legal systems vary within a market. They may differ region­
ally, as with common law tort rules governed by state law in the 
United States. The contract system allows for enormous variation by 
virtue of publicly enforced private law created by contract. There is 
also considerable variation by industry, through both legal enactments 
and public enforcement of private codes and standard terms. Al­
though there are always pressures to unify law to one degree or an­
other at the level of the entire market, countervailing pressures to 
maintain local autonomy, party autonomy, and industry practices typi­
cally yield a pragmatic compromise in each field. 
On the other hand, there are legal systems that cannot function ef­
fectively unless their scope is symmetrical with the market. That is, 
they must govern the interests of all parties throughout the market 
whose interests may be implicated. A common example of such a sys­
tem is the law of intellectual property, which in virtually all jurisdic­
tions is co-extensive with a national market and which imposes rules 
that govern the rights of all potential stakeholders, whether or not 
they have contractual relationships inter se. Such systems are often, 
but not invariably, considered to operate in rem, which may be a label 
37. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: 
Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457 (1991) [hereinafter 
Westbrook, Theory]. 
38. Both Professors LoPucki and Rasmussen assume such a treaty solution in their ma­
jor articles on this subject. LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 742; Rasmussen, A New 
Approach, supra note 29, at 26 n.120. Professor Rasmussen does not imply a time frame for 
such a treaty, while Professor LoPucki is ambiguous as to the temporal context for his pro­
posal. 
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reflecting the need to govern the rights of all possible stakeholders 
throughout a market. 
A legal system that requires a market-wide application may none­
theless permit a considerable amount of variation by contract, by re­
gional or industry rules, or otherwise, but it is characteristic of such 
systems that they have a core of rules that cannot be governed by con­
tract or other submarket systems precisely because those rules must 
apply throughout the market to achieve their functional purposes. 
Despite a lack of general agreement about bankruptcy theory, 
there is a consensus that bankruptcy is a collective legal device that 
operates in each case to protect and adjudicate the interests of many 
stakeholders,39 even though there are disputes about the identity of the 
stakeholders.40 From Jabez Henry to the participants in this sympo­
sium,41 virtually all theorists have agreed that bankruptcy requires a 
single proceeding in which all of the debtor's assets and claims are 
administered under a single set of rules - in traditional terms, in rem. 
To achieve that result, it is necessary that the bankruptcy law cover the 
entire market in which the debtor company operates, and bind all of 
its participants. It is therefore unsurprising that virtually every coun­
try has established a national bankruptcy regime co-extensive with its 
national market. Most tellingly, as with intellectual property law, vir­
tually all federated countries, including those (like the United States) 
that give considerable autonomy to regions (states) in business and 
commercial matters, nonetheless insist that the bankruptcy regime be 
national, to fit the national dimensions of the market. 
That bankruptcy law must be ubiquitous does not mean it cannot 
allow for variation and for private bargains. The bankruptcy systems 
in many countries permit contractual priorities in the form of security 
interests and permit regional policies considerable play, as, for exam­
ple, in the role of state property and commercial laws in bankruptcy 
proceedings in the United States. The bankruptcy system can permit 
considerable flexibility at the level of parties or regions, without losing 
its capacity to regulate the rights of all stakeholders throughout a na­
tional market and regardless of a lack of contractual relationships 
39. One oft-cited discussion is in THOMAS JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986) [hereinafter JACKSON, LOGIC]. 
40. Both legal theories and legal systems differ on this point. For example, some regard 
creditors as the only proper subjects of regard in bankruptcy, while others would consider 
the interests of owners (debtors and their shareholders) as well. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, 
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Cln. L. REV. 777 (1987); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Fo­
rum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 (1987); KAREN 
GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS 138 (1997). See also IMF Report, supra note 2, at 7. 
41. For Henry's interesting story, see FLETCHER, INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY, supra 
note 31, at 17-19; see also JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 39; Kurt H. Nadelmann, Once Again: 
Local Priorities in Bankruptcy, 38 AM. J. INT'LL. 370 (1944) [hereinafter Nadelmann, Local 
Priorities]. 
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among stakeholders. In this way, the interests of secured parties, un­
secured contract creditors, tort victims, taxing authorities, sharehold­
ers, and other stakeholders can be resolved under a set of legal rules 
known in advance and legitimately binding on them all. 
Because the consensus is broad and consistent, a few examples of 
the collective nature of bankruptcy should suffice. Two of the primary 
functions of liquidation bankruptcy are to maximize asset value and to 
distribute proceeds according to a scheme of priority based on legal 
rights.42 The process cannot maximize the value of a debtor's assets 
unless there is a moratorium or stay to prevent individual creditor sei­
zures and a unified approach to assembling and selling those assets.43 
Similarly, neither principles of equality nor a set of legal priorities can 
have their desired effect unless they are applied in a common distribu­
tion.44 Such a collective system cannot operate unless: i) the assets of 
a debtor are part of a common pool for the benefit of stakeholders and 
ii) the rights of all potential stakeholders are finally resolved prior to a 
final distribution. Only a single system operating under a single set of 
overall rules can achieve those unified results. A single system cannot 
be legally effective unless it controls assets and binds stakeholders 
throughout the market. 
Reorganization bankruptcy (often called "rescue" elsewhere) is 
even more dependant upon the existence of a single reorganization ac­
tivity. Although some debtors, or corporate groups, may split neatly 
into separate pieces to be sold or continued individually, most are 
complexly structured, making it very difficult to continue the enter­
prise without a substantially centralized direction.45 Reorganizing a 
company is surgery upon a living being, as opposed to the disposal of 
one that has expired. Interim financing and supervision of the com­
pany's management are only two of the delicate functions that are dif­
ficult to carry out by cooperation between distant judges. If the com­
pany can be kept alive, the goal is a reorganization plan. Such a plan is 
not achievable unless a court can bind all stakeholders to the reorgani­
zation plan, including dissenters.46 Only a system that conclusively re­
solves all stakeholders' legal rights can produce a financial restructur­
ing that gives existing and future parties, including financiers, 
investors, and employees, a sufficient guarantee of legal certainty. 
42 See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 17. 
43. See id. at 37. The ALI text provides examples. 
44. See, e.g., Kurt H. Nadelmann, Revision of Conflicts Provisions in the American 
Bankruptcy Act, 1 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 484, 484 (1952) ("[T]he policy to consider all prop­
erty wherever located part of the estate has practical advantages, besides being the only one 
acceptable from the viewpoint of the equal distribution of all assets among all creditors."). 
45. See infra text accompanying notes 158-164. 
46. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 118. 
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Without such assurances, a reorganization plan cannot go forward. 
Such a system must be symmetrical to the market. 
Turning to an ex ante perspective, to the extent that the outcomes 
of bankruptcy affect the availability and terms of credit and other 
forms of investment, predictability of outcome will tend to reduce 
transaction costs and risk premiums.47 While high levels of predict­
ability are never likely to be achievable in the context of general de­
fault,48 material increases in predictability of outcomes will have be­
nign efficiency effects ex ante. To the extent that a debtor's affairs are 
governed by a single legal regime, predictability, and therefore effi­
ciency, will be enhanced. 
It is therefore not surprising that when the Founders of the 
American Republic assembled to create a federation with a single na­
tional market they gave the national government the power to govern 
general defaults. Although bankruptcy occupies a privileged position 
as one of the few enumerated powers given to Congress in Article I, it 
received only cursory attention in the constitutional debates.49 The 
likely reason is that the necessity for a single national law governing 
such collective proceedings seemed self-evident.50 A sophisticated 
American voter in 1788 might have been against a national market, or 
thought its faults outweighed its virtues, but it would have been hard 
to deny such a market should be served by a national bankruptcy sys­
tem. It is especially noteworthy that the Founders did not think the 
national market required national commercial laws, but left such mat­
ters to the states. Bankruptcy was the commercial law uniquely re­
quired at the national level. The compelling logic of this result is con-
47. See Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 2177, 2179, 2181, 22fl7 (2000); Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational 
Insolvencies Through Private Ordering, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2252, 2255 (2000). 
48. This point represents a hole in the literature that must be filled, although not by this 
Article. A theoretical model relating to insolvency must reflect the reality that general de­
fault produces considerable chaos and in many cultures, including our own, considerable liti­
gation. To construct a model implicit with calm and deliberation is like a model of efficient 
firefighting that assumes a leisurely encounter with the fire. To put the point another way, 
there is an enormous potential for transaction costs built into the circumstance of general 
default The minimization of those costs is one of the principal tasks of the theorist and the 
policymaker. The costs must be accounted for in any solution that is modeled or the model 
is useless. Assuming them away ignores the central problem, like the economist shipwrecked 
on the desert island who proposes to solve the problem of opening a can of food by assuming 
a can opener. 
49. See James Madison, The Federalist No. 43, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, 271 (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1105 {1833) (noting that the Federalist Papers contain only a single refer­
ence to the bankruptcy powers); Dan J. Schulman, The Constitution, Interest Groups, and the 
Requirements of Uniformity: The United States Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator 
Programs, 74 NEB. L. REV. 91, 99-105 {1995) (discussing the few indications of the original 
intent behind the bankruptcy power). 
50. The importance of the task was outweighed for a long time by its difficulty. See infra 
text accompanying note 110. 
June 2000] A Global Solution to Multinational Default 2287 
firmed by the fact that similar systems are found in many nations with 
federal structures.51 The historical experience has been that bank­
ruptcy law is made coextensive with a market, so that national markets 
require national bankruptcy laws, even where many other legal re­
gimes are left to, or devolved to, a subsidiary level.52 
Domestically, all of this is commonplace and almost universally ac­
cepted.53 It is certainly common ground among the contributors to this 
symposium. It follows that precisely the same logic will compel crea­
tion of a single legal regime to govern general defaults at the interna­
tional level as soon as that is achievable.54 Just as most commercial 
and property law in the United States remains at the state level, it is 
reasonable to assume that an international convention need not at­
tempt to create an entire international commercial system.55 But in my 
view it would certainly create a system administering a single bank­
ruptcy law in a single, worldwide bankruptcy proceeding, if that were 
politically possible. It would do so for exactly the same reasons that 
have been compelling domestically, reasons that are even more cogent 
internationally. 
Because bankruptcy is a market-symmetrical law, a global market 
requires a global bankruptcy law. A global default - that is, the gen­
eral default of a multinational company - requires a single bank­
ruptcy proceeding that can apply rules and reach results that are con­
clusive with respect to all stakeholders throughout the global market. 
Anything short of that procedure is, at best, a temporary accommoda­
tion that awaits the political will to achieve the proper legal result. 
51. With respect to the structural similarities between the members of NAFTA, see Jay 
Lawrence Westbrook & Jacob S. Ziegel, The American Law Institute NAFTA Insolvency 
Project, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 7, 13-14 (1997) ("In insolvency matters, all three [NAFTA] 
jurisdictions have the same basic statutory structure, with state or provincial laws governing 
most questions of contract and property, but with a federal insolvency law."). Additionally, 
the new German Bankruptcy Code shares federal aspects with the United States. See 
Manfred Baiz, Market Conformity Of Insolvency Proceedings: Policy Issues Of The German 
Insolvency Law, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 167 (1997); Kamiah, supra note 4. 
52. One United States example is bankruptcy law at the national level, but the Co=er­
cial Code at the state level. 
53. A proposal was made in recent years to move bankruptcy to the state level, but it is 
fair to say that it has not attracted any enthusiasm. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the 
Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEXAS ,L. REV. 471 (1994). 
54. See Hannah Buxbaum, Rethinking International Insolvency: The Neglected Choice­
of-Law Rules and Theory, 36 STANFORD J. INT'L L. 23, 60 (2000) (arguing for a single juris­
diction internationally following the logic of domestic practice). 
55. See Donald T. Trautman, Jay Lawrence Westbrook & E=anuel Gaillard, Four 
Models for International Bankruptcy, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 573 (1994). 
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2. Convergence of Laws 
The link between the consensus that a domestic bankruptcy law 
must be contiguous with a national market and the present discussion 
is, of course, the emergence of a global market. As noted above, there 
are always pressures to make laws symmetrical with a market. As the 
rush to globalization, reinforced by the internet, continues, there will 
be increased pressure to establish global legal rules.56 For example, 
there is great pressure for protection of endangered species, a value 
that comes into apparent conflict with certain aspects of free trade.57 
Nations will have to achieve some convergence on those questions to 
resolve the conflict, typically through some combination of interna­
tional rules and modification of the domestic rules in each country. 
The best example we have is the European Union ("EU"), although 
the larger world market offers important illustrations as well. 
During the last half century, the development of the EU has dem­
onstrated that international economic integration tends to generate le­
gal convergence. Although some members would prefer a purely eco­
nomic relationship, experience has shown that is not possible. 
Economic issues are, after all, at the heart of many political issues and 
the resolution of those issues typically becomes law, so that closer po­
litical ties and converging laws inevitably accompany closer economic 
integration.58 For example, economic integration inevitably leads to a 
56. See generally Bruce A. Markell, A View from the Field: Some Observations on the 
Effect of International Commercial Law Reform on the Rule of Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. 
S. 497 (1999) [hereinafter Markell, Observations]. 
57. See GATI: United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATI B.I.S.D. {39th 
Supp.) at 155 (1993) (Dispute Settlement Panel Report); GATI United States Restrictions 
on Imports of Tuna, 33 l.L.M. 839 (1994) (Dispute Settlement Panel Report); United States 
- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 36 l.L.M. 121 (World Trade 
Org., Oct. 12, 1998) (Appellate Body Report). A recent case in the European Court of Jus­
tice highlights the close connection between economic integration and integration of social 
policy. See Case C-50196, A.G. v. Schroder, at 'll 54 (2000) (in the context of gender discrimi­
nation in employment, one of the objectives of Article 119 of the EC Treaty "is to avoid a 
situation in which [companies in State with laws requiring equal pay] suffer a competitive 
disadvantage . . . as compared with [companies in States that have not]."). The issue of the 
competitive connection between economic and social integration was a prominent subject at 
an informal colloquium between members of the University of Texas Law School faculty and 
members of the European Court of Justice in Austin, Texas, on April 21, 2000. The collo· 
quium was sponsored by the Supreme Court of Texas. 
58. Three different philosophies of Western European integration vied for adoption in 
the immediate post-WW II era: federalism, functionalism, and neofunctionalism. The fed­
eralist philosophy, represented by Rene Pleven, French premier in 1950, was based on the 
view that unification would best be achieved by going to the heart of the matter and creating 
supranational institutions with substantial power (e.g., an all-European army). The essence 
of the federalist philosophy is reflected in the slogan "The worst way to cross a chasm is in 
little steps." According to the functionalists, integration of states can be achieved best by 
creating loosely knit organizations with authority only over technical economic tasks. As 
one technical task would "spillover" into other areas, integration forces will become over­
whelming. Neofunctionalists, led by Jean Monnet, believed that the integration process 
should focus on creating supranational organizations for specific but politically significant 
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conflict between the laws regulating the flow of goods and services in 
the various integrating countries. France has always limited the word 
"champagne" to a wine from a certain region of France, while other 
European countries permitted it to be used more broadly to refer to a 
type of sparkling wine wherever produced. If there was to be a single 
market in wine, the legal conflict had to be resolved.59 Much the same 
legal conflict existed with respect to the standard for something to be 
called "beer."60 Although similar problems are arising globally,61 the 
EU provides by far the largest and most useful example of conver­
gence of laws as economic integration progresses.62 
A few leading examples illustrate the process of convergence. 
Early in the development of the EU, its members adopted a common 
tax, the VAT.63 It has moved steadily toward convergence in taxation 
ever since.64 It has also moved step-by-step closer to a universal labor 
policy resting upon "the free movement of persons."65 The latter con­
cept has produced results that would have been politically unthinkable 
not so long ago. Increasingly, for example, lawyers and other profes­
sionals licensed in one EU country must be permitted to practice in all 
tasks (e.g., coal and steel industries). For a fuller discussion, see ERNST B. HAAS, THE 
UNITING OF EUROPE {1958). The key point these philosophies had in common, which has 
been demonstrated in the subsequent history of the European Community, is that economic 
integration leads to political and legal convergence. 
59. See Tattinger v. Allbev Ltd., [1992] F.S.R. 647 (Ch. Apr. 15, 1992); Tattinger v. 
Allbev Ltd., [1993] F.S.R. 641 (Ch. Feb. 8, 1993), reported in THE TIMES (London), Feb. 11, 
1993, at 2, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Alleur File. 
60. See Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227, 1268-72. 
61. Another example is the movement toward convergence of rules concerning securi­
ties because of the globalization of the capital markets. See, e.g., lNT'L FIN. L. REV., U.S. 
CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT (1999). 
62. By a paradox more apparent than real, it also increases the pressure for devolution 
and subsidiarity as to certain kinds of issues. See, e.g., Nicholas Emiliou, Subsidiarity: An 
Effective Barrier Against "the Enterprises of Ambition"?, 17 EUR. L. REV. 383 (1992) (dis­
cussing the role of subsidiarity in the EU). 
63. See TREATY EsTABLISIIlNG THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 
1957, art. 99, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 76. 
64. Recently, the issue of withholding taxes from savings has proven controversial, see 
Dominic Hobson, Mobile Capital: Outrunning the Tax Man, WALL ST. J. EUR. 10, Mar. 16, 
2000, yet the convergence of European taxation continues. Since January 1, 1993, the EU 
countries have had a standard minimum VAT rate of fifteen percent, with reduced rates of 
no less than five percent on specified categories of goods and services. See Jan E. 
Brinkmann & Andreas 0. Riecker, European Community Taxation: The Ruding Committee 
Report Gives Harmonization Efforts a New Impetus, 27 lNT'L LAW. 1061, 1063 n.6 (1993). 
Recently, the idea of EU-wide internet taxation is gaining popularity. See John Kennedy, 
Taxing the Net: The European Union is Keen to Implement a Framework for Applying VAT 
on Internet Transactions, Bus. AND FIN., Oct. 22, 1998. 
65. See Harry Valetk, Note, "I Cannot Eat Air!": An Economic Analysis of Interna­
tional Immigration Law for the 21st Century, 7 CARDOZO J. lNT'L & COMP. L. 141, 174 
(1999) (summarizing the development of EU labor policies). 
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the rest.66 Students who are qualified must be admitted without dis­
crimination in schools throughout the Union.67 
Similarly, the free movement of services has enabled companies of­
fering finance and banking services to operate everywhere in the Un­
ion with dwindling territorial restraints,68 a development closely tied to 
the Euro and the establishment of a European Central Bank.69 The 
pressures of globalization will create similar convergences throughout 
the world - indeed, are already doing so.70 There are endless inter­
esting questions about how all this can be managed politically and how 
fast it will develop, but there can be no serious question about the 
trend. 
66. See generally Roger J. Goebel, Lawyers in the European Community: Progress To· 
wards Community-Wide Rights of Practice, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 556 (1992); Bernhard 
Schloh, Freedom of Movement of Lawyers within the European Economic Community, 9 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 83 (1990); Diane M. Venezia, Note, An EU Lawyer's Right to Prac­
tice Throughout the European Union, 3 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 427 (1995). 
67. See THE HERALD, Feb. 19, 2000 (United Kingdom). 
68. See Maria Szonert-Binienda, Passporting Financial Services Throughout the Euro­
pean Union, 116 BANKING L.J. 456 (1999); Jennifer Manvell Jeannot, Note, An International 
Perspective on Domestic Banking Reform: Could the European Union's Second Banking Di­
rective Revolutionize the Way the United States Regulates Its Own Financial Services Indus­
try?, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1715, 1731-38 (1999) (reviewing the EU's liberal approach to 
regulation of the financial services industry). 
69. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commission, 38 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9, 15 (1999) ("[W)ith the introduction of the euro, a window of opportu­
nity has opened for integrating financial services."). 
70. See, e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 
4809 (1994) (patent); The Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 
Stat. 2853 (1988) (copyright). 
Antitrust presents a similar trend toward convergence of laws. There are a number of 
commentaries on the influence of U.S. antitrust laws on other countries. "The success of the 
United States in curbing anticompetitive behavior in its domestic markets led South Korea 
and Japan to adopt antitrust laws similar to those of the United States." Danny Abir, Mo­
nopoly and Merger Regulation in South Korea and Japan: A Comparative Analysis, 13 INT'L 
TAX & Bus. L. 143, 143 (1996). "Because Taiwan began with a tabula rasa regarding anti­
trust law, the Fair Trade Law was patterned primarily after the antitrust laws of advanced 
industrial states - notably Japan, South Korea, Germany, and the United States." 
Lawrence L.C. Lee, Taiwan's Antitrust Statutes: Proposals for A Regulatory Regime and 
Comparison of U.S. and Taiwanese Antitrust Law, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 595 
(1996). There is growing cooperation internationally in the antitrust area as well. See, e.g., 
U.S. Backs International Merger Body in Move to Ease Regulatory Friction, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 15, 2000 (call for international regulation of mergers, reversing long-held U.S. policy); 
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
ofJapan Concerning Cooperation on Anticompetitive Activities (Oct. 7, 1999) <http://www. 
usdoj.gov/atr/public/internationaUdocs/3740.htm> reprinted in U.S. Dep't of Justice, Anti­
trust Div., Press Release, United States and Japan Sign Antitrust Cooperation Agreement 
(Oct. 7, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1999/3739.htm>; Agreement 
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Australia 
on Mutual Antitrust Enforcement Assistance (Apr. 27, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ 
public/internationaUdocs/usaus7.htm>, reprinted in U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., 
Press Release, Attorney General Signs Antitrust Assistance Agreement with Australia (Apr. 
27, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_release/1999/2382.htm>. 
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Professor LoPucki quotes me as saying that a rough similarity of 
laws is necessary to universalism.71 What I have in mind by such a 
statement is this general convergence of laws. Professor LoPucki's 
implication is that I am conceding that universalism will not be achiev­
able for a very long time, because laws will long remain dissimilar. On 
the contrary, it is my sense that global economic integration is driving 
convergence of law at a surprisingly fast pace and this trend will make 
it possible to achieve a workable international bankruptcy system 
much sooner than might have been thought.72 
This general convergence of law yields a mix of international rules 
and modification of local rules. In those fields that require market 
symmetry, however, there will always be pressure for market-wide 
rules. Again, the EU experience is illustrative. In the field of intellec­
tual property, which must also be market symmetrical, there is now a 
European Patent Office.73 Although there are still national patent of­
fices in Europe, the European office represents a very significant in­
ternationalization.74 
Even more directly to the point, the EU has now adopted an insol­
vency regulation governing cooperation in cross-border insolvency 
matters.75 While the regulation is only a modest first step, it is most 
significant that its recitals base its adoption on the need for market­
wide regulation.76 It specifically states that "[t]he proper functioning 
of the internal market requires that cross-border insolvency proceed­
ings should operate efficiently and effectively . . . .  " and that "[t]he ac­
tivities of undertakings have more and more cross-border effects and 
71. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bank­
ruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216, 2216 (2000) [hereinafter LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality]. 
Of course, I did not say similar laws are necessary to modified universalism, my proposed 
interim approach. 
72 See generally Markell, Observations, supra note 56; Spencer Weber Waller, The In­
ternationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 11 BOSTONU. L. REV. 343 (1997). 
73. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, as amended by Decision of the 
Administration Council of the European Patent Organization of Dec. 21, 1978, 13 l.L.M. 
268. 
74. See Vivian S. Kuo & Gerald J. Mossinghoff, World Patent System Circa 20xx, A.D, 
38 IDEA 529, 541-42 (1998). 
Id. 
Under the EPC system, it is possible to file a single patent application with the European 
Patent Office ("EPO") in one of the three official languages - English, French and German 
- and obtain patent protection in one, several or all of the nineteen contracting states if the 
applicant so desires. An issued patent from the EPC confers on the inventor the same rights 
as would be conferred by a national patent granted in a designated state. However, this ap­
plication effort does not result in a single Community patent. Applicants to the EPO receive 
a series of patents, akin to a 'bundle of rights,' enforceable in each member state designated 
by the applicant. Patent rights are enforced by the respective courts of the member states as 
if the patents were issued by each state individually. 
75. See EU Regulation, supra note 25. 
76. See id. at Recitals 2-4, 8. 
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are therefore increasingly being regulated by Community law."77 The 
text goes on to imply that movement to a community-wide proceeding 
"with universal scope" is not attempted only because "it is not practi­
cal."78 While this regulation demonstrates the difficulty of achieving 
legal integration in the complex field of insolvency, it also provides the 
most important contemporary example of the way in which economic 
integration exerts inexorable pressure toward universalism. 
3. A Unified Law and Forum 
There are two elements necessary to a universalist convention for 
international bankruptcy: a single law and a single forum to govern 
each multinational case. These two elements are distinct and need not 
necessarily be conjoined in an international bankruptcy system, al­
though ideally they would be.79 Either could be achieved, at least in 
theory, by two different approaches - unified international institu­
tions, or a unified set of conflicts rules. The first approach would es­
tablish a single international bankruptcy law and a single international 
bankruptcy court system, while the second would prescribe a uniform 
set of choice-of-law rules and choice-of-forum rules. However, choice­
of-law rules are notoriously nonuniform and unpredictable, so a single 
law is, in principle, much more desirable from an ex ante perspective. 
Experience with the Restatement Second in the United States demon­
strates the difficulty in achieving predictable choice-of-law results with 
any rule, no matter how carefully and insightfully crafted the text may 
be.80 A single forum also would be desirable because some of the 
same problems exist with choice-of-forum rules,81 and multiple fora 
present problems of inconsistent administration. 
A single international system of bankruptcy courts would achieve 
many of the benefits provided domestically by a single, national bank­
ruptcy law.82 Admittedly, a court in such a system would still have 
77. Id. at Recitals 2 & 3. The phrase "internal market" means the community-wide 
market. 
78. Id. at Recital 11. 
79. See Westbrook, Theory, supra note 37. 
80. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts Restatement (and a Pro­
posal for Torts Conflicts), 75 IND. L.J. 437, 446 (2000) (recognizing that the flexibility re­
quired from a conflicts Restatement renders precision, and hence predictability, more diffi­
cult); Russell J. Weintraub, "At Least Do No Harm": Does the Second Restatement of 
Contracts Meet the Hippocratic Oath?, 56 MD. L. REv. 1284, 1315 (1997) (same). 
81. See FLETCHER, INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY, supra note 31, at 771. 
82. The text of the ALI's Principles sets forth the principal benefits of a centralized in­
ternational bankruptcy system. As the foregoing discussion indicates, a single international 
court applying a single international bankruptcy law would best achieve each of those objec­
tives. This discussion follows the listing of the major benefits of bankruptcy in the ALI 
Statement, supra note 15, at 17, and is similar to those identified in the IMF Report, supra 
note 2, at 81-82. 
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many choice-of-law decisions to make in determining the proper na­
tional law to apply with respect to various pre-bankruptcy claims and 
property rights. Nonetheless, administration by a single court system, 
applying a single set of choice-of-law rules with some hope of consis­
tency, would produce a far higher level of predictability in commercial 
transactions than we now have. 
A single court would maximize asset values, even in liquidation, by 
providing a unified approach to assembly and sale of assets as a whole. 
If it commanded a worldwide stay, it could most effectively protect 
those assets prior to sale. Establishment of such a court would make 
preventing or undoing debtor fraud far easier and more certain, an es­
pecially urgent goal in a world of electronic funds transfers and asset­
protection trusts.83 
A single court would improve dramatically the possibility of reor­
ganization. With a single court to whom the manager of the reorgani­
zation could report and a single mechanism for adjusting the interests 
of stakeholders, the possibility of saving a sprawling multinational 
corporation would be greatly increased. For example, the ease of or­
ganizing and administering the necessary post-petition financing84 and 
the greater certainty of the lender's protection on a worldwide basis 
would increase the availability of credit and reduce interest rates. A 
single court that was part of an international court system would also 
lower the risk of parochialism in the administration of the case. 
A single international bankruptcy law would also confer unique 
benefits. It would create a single set of priorities and method of distri­
bution, ensuring equality for stakeholders with similar legal rights eve­
rywhere in the world.85 Perhaps most important to the stability and ef­
ficiency of the global commercial community, it would provide one 
consistent set of transfer-avoidance rules (such as preference and 
fraudulent conveyance avoidance), so that creditors would know the 
rules and would know they were protected against strategic behavior 
by debtors and other creditors. These are two separate points, each of 
83. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission v. Affordable Media L.L.C., 179 F.3d 1228 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (offshore asset protection trusts are intended to create a scenario whereby a "de­
fendant can assert that compliance with a court's order to repatriate the trust assets is impos­
sible"); In re Lawrence, 238 B.R. 498 (Bankr. S.D. Fl. 1999) (imposing high burden of proof 
on debtor seeking to avoid a turnover order because of asset protection trust). See generally, 
Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake and Eating It 
Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 11 (1994) (describing various approaches to asset protection); T. 
Moers Mayer, Will the Lawyers Pay? Counsel's Ethical, Civil and Criminal Exposure for 
Creating Offshore Asset Protection Trusts (Spring Meeting of the Business Law Committee 
of the ABA, Apr. 5, 1997) (discussing the ethical and legal implications of asset protection 
trusts for the lawyers that form them). 
84. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 364, 365 (1994); ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE 
WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 530-31 (3d ed. 1996). 
85. The present territorial system virtually ensures that no nation's ideas of efficiency 
and fairness are followed. See Westbrook, Theory, supra note 37, at 461. 
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some importance. Because creditors would know the avoidance rules 
that would be applied, they could confidently structure loans and 
workouts within those rules. They would have some incentive to es­
chew transfers and other transactions that violate economic policy, 
thus enforcing that policy and avoiding very expensive litigation.86 At 
the same time, they could obtain reliable legal opinions that certain 
approaches to restructuring the finances of a distressed debtor would 
pass muster if the restructuring failed and bankruptcy followed. 
Such predictability in avoidance rules would have another favor­
able impact on out-of-court workouts. Where such rules are consis­
tently enforced, creditors attempting to reach a consensual restruc­
turing can be reasonably sure that secret deals with certain creditors or 
other persons could be unraveled in the event of general default. Pro­
viding that protection is one of the most important functions of avoid­
ance rules. In both respects, then, creditors would have the relative 
predictability and workout protection they enjoy now in legally sophis­
ticated societies. 
Is a single international bankruptcy law administered by a single 
international court system87 possible in the foreseeable future? It is 
implausible, but not, I think, impossible. Political predictions are al­
ways unreliable and I have nothing to offer in support of mine except a 
fair amount of recent experience in the politics of international insol­
vency reform.88 We do have exemplary methods of achieving such re­
sults. Twenty-five years ago, the idea of an international forum with 
the power effectively to overrule a United States court would have 
been inconceivable to many, but the NAFTA trade tribunals are em­
powered to do that, albeit indirectly.89 The Law of the Sea Treaty has 
86. The problems are well illustrated by In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 
800 (Banlcr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff d, 186 B.R. 807 {S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff d, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 
1996). 
87. I say "court system," because it is unlikely that a convention would establish a single 
court, like the International Court of Justice at the Hague, to administer a vital part of a 
global commercial system. It is much more likely that there would be regional courts or, in 
the case of the largest economies, international courts devoted to bankruptcies centered in a 
single country. These courts might be limited purpose commercial courts and more like arbi· 
tration tribunals than traditional courts. There are many interesting details, but they are not 
for this Article. I use "court" and "court system" interchangeably in this article, as clarity 
and ease of expression require, but I will always mean a court system in this context. 
88. I am the United States Reporter for the ALI Transnational Insolvency Project and 
the co-chair of the United States delegation to UNCITRAL in connection with bankruptcy 
matters. I also serve as a consultant to the International Monetary Fund on such matters and 
I am a member of the Insolvency Task Force of the World Bank. 
89. In cases involving anti-dumping and countervailing duty issues, parties to the 
NAFTA may appeal national court rulings to a bilateral panel. See North American Free 
Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Art. 1904(2), 32 
I.L.M. 605, 683 ("NAFT A"). The rulings of these panels, based on the substantive law of the 
importing country, are binding upon the parties and not subject to judicial review in national 
courts. See id.; § 19 U.S.C.A. 1516a(g)(2) (Supp. 1997) (exclusive review by binational pan­
els); RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., NAFTA: A PROBLEM ORIENTED CASEBOOK 465 (2000). 
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created an Authority that may someday have both administrative and 
adjudicatory power over an important percentage of the world's 
wealth under the seas.90 And, of course, the European Court of Justice 
has become a truly international court with "direct effect" on persons 
and companies throughout Europe and around the world.91 
There is a sharper international sting in a patent's tail nowadays, 
because of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
("TRIPS") provisions linking intellectual property rights to trade 
privileges under the WT0.92 A linkage of this sort makes an interna­
tional rule more nearly enforceable in the sense that a domestic rule of 
law is enforceable. The linkage is plausible because of the close con­
nection between intellectual property and the free flow of trade and 
investment.93 It may be that the excesses of intellectual-property law 
will produce a backlash against this sort of linkage.94 If not, linkages of 
Already, cases have challenged the constitutionality of this procedure, but thus far have not 
met with success. See American Coalition For Competitive Trade v. Clinton, 128 F.3d 761 
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (dismissing constitutional challenge to review of national rulings by a bina­
tional NAFfA panel and affirming constitutionality of the treaty-based exhaustion require­
ment). 
90. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, reprinted in THE 
LAW OFTHE SEA, U.N. Doc. Al CONF. 62/122, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983). 
91. See, e.g., Eric F. Hinton, Strengthening the Effectiveness of Community Law: Direct 
Effect, Article 5 EC, and the European Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 307, 308 
(1999) ("Much of European integration has been legal integration, and at the forefront of 
the integration movement has been the European Court of Justice."). As to its worldwide 
impact, one example is its interpretation of the competition rules of article 85 of the Treaty 
of Rome. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, arts. 85-94, Mar. 25, 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, amended by Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 
1992, 1992 OJ. (C 224) 1, 1 C.M.L.R. 573. That interpretation is binding on the European 
Commission, which in turn can effectively veto mergers of multinationals centered outside 
the EU. See, e.g., Andre Fiebig, The Extraterritorial Application of the European Merger 
Control Regulation, 5 CO LUM. J. EUR. L. 79 (1998); Crystal Jones-Starr, Community-Wide v. 
Worldwide Competition: Why European Enforcement Agencies Are Able to Force American 
Companies to Modify Their Merger Proposals and Limit Their Innovations, 17 WIS. INT'L 
L.J. 145 (1999); Amy Ann Karpel, Comment, The European Commission's Decision on the 
Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and the Need For Greater U.S.-EU Cooperation in the 
Merger Field, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1029 (1998) (all discussing the world-wide impact of the 
European Commission's stated doubts about whether the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas 
merger would be consistent with EU competition laws). 
92. At least two symposia have discussed the impact of the TRIPS provisions on intellec­
tual property issues. See Symposium, Public and Private Initiatives After TRIPS, 9 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT'L L. 1 (1998); Symposium, Intellectual Property Law in the International Mar­
ketplace - Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Right: Enforcement and Dispute 
Resolution 37 VIRG. J. INT'L L. 275 (1997). 
93. See generally J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders To Fair Followers: Global Competi­
tion Under The TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11 (1997). 
94. Both domestically and internationally, there are claims that recent strengthening of 
the intellectual property laws may have gone too far in limiting free trade and innovation. 
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE LJ. 283 
(1996) (proposing the "democratic paradigm" as a method for successfully balancing protec­
tion of intellectual property with the goal of innovation); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright For 
Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 153-54 (1998) (contending policymakers, in 
broadening copyright protection to offer additional incentive or reward to creators, may 
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that sort might be used to develop other international commercial re­
gimes, like a bankruptcy law, that can similarly claim a close connec­
tion to encouragement of truly global trade and investment. 
The WTO is a global forum with real teeth.95 The United States, 
for example, has simply ignored the rulings of the World Court,96 but 
takes very seriously rulings from a WTO panel.97 The WTO example 
makes it no longer easy to dismiss a proposal for a truly international 
forum to administer rules relating to worldwide commerce. If bank­
ruptcy law were to follow intellectual property law in being tied to the 
GAIT, it would have similar international leverage. 
Another approach would be the Bilateral Investment Treaties 
("BITs") that the United States and other capital-exporting countries 
have negotiated with a number of countries.98 Membership in an in­
ternational bankruptcy system, providing for a single law and a single 
forum, might easily become a standard term sought in such treaties. A 
bankruptcy system is especially important to investors, so its inclusion 
in BITs would be wholly appropriate. Certain crucial aspects of bank­
ruptcy law, like the treatment of taxes, could be covered in the spe-
have lost sight of whether additional reward was necessary or justified). But see David 
Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 
739-40 (2000) (arguing that the new copyright act insufficiently protects copyright holders). 
95. Its supporters don't like the characterization "arbitrators," and its opponents don't 
like "court." Forum is a neutral term. 
96. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. REP. 392 (Judg· 
ment of Nov. 26). The United States official statement of withdrawal from the case may be 
found in U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the ICJ, Jan. 18, 
1985, DEP'T ST. BULL., Mar. 1985, at 64. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. REP. 14 (Judgment of June 27). For 
discussion of the case, and the effect of the United States withdrawal on the influence of the 
International Court of Justice, see, for example, Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, 
and the World Court, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1445 (1985); W. Michael Reisman, The Other Shoe 
Falls: The Future of Article 36(1) Jurisdiction in Light of Nicaragua, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 166 
(1987). 
97. While the United States blatantly disregards the International Court of Justice when 
needs require, it has consistently engaged the WTO despite disagreeing often with \VfO 
rulings. Recently, within a few months following a WTO ruling against a United States tax 
subsidy for exports, the United States promptly proposed substantial changes in its tax law to 
accommodate the ruling. See, e.g., U.S. Offers to Satisfy WTO Ruling By Ending Tax Break 
for Exporters, WALL ST. J., May 3, 200  (proposal to amend U.S. tax law to satisfy adverse 
ruling by WTO panel on U.S. tax-subsidy provision). Another recent example comes from 
the conflict with Europe over the EU's refusal to import beef products enhanced by growth 
hormones. Statement Of Ambassador David L. Aaron, Under Secretary For International 
Trade, U.S. Department of Commerce, Before the House Comm. on International Rela­
tions, June 15, 1999, available in 1999 WL 20008799 ("The United States will respect the 
WTO process and participate fully in [the beef importation] arbitration process."). 
98. See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Ex­
plaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (1998); 
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 MICH. J. 
INT'L L. 621 (1993) (discussing the historical and modem uses of BITs for the United States). 
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cialized treaties being routinely negotiated and re-negotiated in spe­
cialized fields.99 
The remarkable movement toward globalization and legal conver­
gence has recently been epitomized by the Model Law on Cross­
Border Insolvency.100 The announcement of this project by the United 
National Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") in 
1995 was greeted by widespread pessimism that any treaty or model 
law on the subject of bankruptcy could be achieved. The promulga­
tion of the Model Law by UNCITRAL and its prospective adoption 
by leading commercial nations101 reflect the compelling logic of inter­
national cooperation in this field. 
As noted above, there is a worldwide wave of domestic bankruptcy 
law reform currently building to a crest.102 It has been stimulated in 
significant part by the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, whose interest was aroused by the East Asian crisis, but the re­
form wave pre-dates that interest and has broader causes.103 In signifi­
cant part, it is a response to the rapidly changing methods and scope of 
international finance and the concerns of investors about the man­
agement of risk. Given current trends and given the close connection 
between bankruptcy and investment risk, it is possible that a truly uni­
fied international bankruptcy system could be achieved. 
If so, we would then have a system both "universal" and "unitary," 
a single law administered by a single court. This result would be true 
"universalism."104 The other three authors in this symposium have not 
really addressed universalism in this sense in their prior writings. Nei­
ther have I. But surely universalism so understood must be accepted 
as the best long-term solution for multinational bankruptcies.105 Given 
that all modem bankruptcy theories assume a collective regime, and 
given that virtually all countries have national bankruptcy laws, co­
terminous with their national markets and transcending their regional 
governments, it is hard to imagine a bankruptcy scholar rejecting uni­
versalism as the correct ultimate goal internationally. It seems likely 
99. The ALI Statement proposes that the difficult problem of coordinating or accom­
modating domestic tax priorities in a multinational bankruptcy be addressed by treaty. See 
ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 19. The numerous, ongoing tax-treaty negotiations be­
tween the United States and its friends are an obvious place to start. 
100. MODEL LAW, supra note 16. 
101. See supra text accompanying notes 16-23. 
102 See supra text accompanying notes 2-15. 
103. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Globalization of Insolvency Reform, 1999 NEW 
ZEALAND L. REV. 401, 402-03. 
104. I have led the way in avoiding the traditional terms, "universalist" and "unitary," in 
referring to a single law and a single forum. See Trautman et al., supra note 55, at 587. They 
have become less useful for various reasons, including ambiguous usage and a lack of con­
nection with the rest of modem conflicts analysis. 
105. See supra text accompanying notes 82 and 87. 
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that our differences relate to shorter-term and transitional solutions, 
which are much more difficult. 
4. The Continuing Role of National Policies 
There is one argument against complete universalism even in the 
long term: that a single international law would give insufficient play 
to domestic policies in each nation. This argument must be distin­
guished from the political claim that national policies will remain 
sharply different in the short and medium term, making universalism 
impractical. That claim has considerable force and may delay a treaty 
establishing universalism for a long time. The theoretical argument is 
that a single international bankruptcy regime will suppress necessary 
and important differences in policy among still-distinct national socie­
ties and cultures. There are three reasons that need not be true. 
The first is that, just as state law is prevalent in domestic bankrupt­
cies in the United States and other federated states, most of the law 
applied in an international bankruptcy case will continue to be na­
tional law. Indeed, even rules about priority of distribution can be 
kept at the national level to some extent under an international bank­
ruptcy law. Our domestic practice is instructive. Security interests and 
other liens created under state law are routinely applied in a federal 
bankruptcy case, with limited exceptions for certain lien priorities that 
Congress has determined inappropriate in the bankruptcy context.106 
Thus each state is allowed, within limits, to grant priorities in bank­
ruptcy distributions. Using the lien device, a universalist bankruptcy 
law could allow play to national priorities, within limits. For example, 
it could permit enforcement of liens or oth�r priorities against work 
product produced by contractors, just as Congress has done.107 Similar 
national priorities could be enforced with respect to employees, tort 
victims, or others within an agreed international framework. 
The second reason we need not be concerned about universalism 
leaving too little room for local policies is that we have the option of 
applying an international regime only to companies of a certain size or 
a certain level of international activity. Limited application of a uni­
versalist regime only to large multinationals would permit local poli-
106. See 11 U.S.C. § 545 {1994). 
107. See, e.g., id. {permitting avoidance of some state-law liens, but not others). See also 
LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 746. Professor LoPucki suggests that under univer­
salism foreign courts would be enjoining United States environmental laws and othenvise 
imposing on United States policies. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 71, at 
122-23. That result is obviously neither necessary nor conceivable in any universalist system 
we would accept. His example is a Brazilian stay of the application of environmental laws to 
a debtor's operations in the United States. A stay's effect in a universalist system undoubt­
edly would be subject to the same police-power exception we have in our national law. See 
11 U.S.C. § 362(b){4). Among many other things, that exception protects the continuing ap­
plication of state environmental laws. A universalist system would work in a similar way. 
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cies to be applied to local enterprises. As subsequent discussion will 
show, many local policies cannot be applied effectively to multination­
als,103 so little is lost locally by international governance of multina­
tionals. Finally, as noted at the start, this discussion focuses on com­
mercial entities - corporations and perhaps very rich individuals -
rather than on consumers. It is likely that a universalist treaty would 
do the same, leaving the most sensitive questions of social policy to 
domestic law.109 
B. Interim Solutions 
To this point, I have argued that the proper long-term, theoretical 
solution to the problem of multinational insolvency is universalism, 
whether or not such a solution is achievable in the foreseeable future. 
Although I am more optimistic than others, universalism may not be 
obtainable in the foreseeable future. To fashion such a system would 
require international consensus as to many questions that could not be 
left to domestic law. Even with global legal convergence, such a con­
sensus may take a long time to achieve. To balance the fact that the 
Founders of the United States regarded a national bankruptcy law as 
essential, enacting one about a decade after the Constitution was 
adopted, we must consider that our ancestors did not succeed in fash­
ioning a workable bankruptcy law for more than a hundred years. The 
nineteenth-century laws each lasted only a few years.U0 Not until 109 
years after the adoption of the Constitution did the United States 
achieve a permanent bankruptcy law. Our friends in the EU labored 
for more than thirty years to create a Union-wide bankruptcy re­
gime.111 Because there is room for pessimism as to when a bankruptcy 
treaty might be achieved, a discussion of transitional approaches is in 
order. What follows is an overall summary, postponing responses to 
specific arguments raised by others until the next section. 
The Statement of Principles adopted by the American Law Insti­
tute summarizes the current taxonomy of reform: 
Marious reform efforts can be characterized as based on modified 
universalism or modified territorialism, where those two concepts lie be­
tween the ends of a spectrum from universalism to territorialism. Modi­
fied universalism is universalism tempered by a sense of what is practical 
at the current stage of international legal development, while modified 
territorialism represents a movement away from territorialism in recogni­
tion of the increasing integration of the world economy . . . .  
108. See infra text preceding note 150. 
109. See supra text accompanying note 34. 
110. See generally Charles J. Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United 
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995). 
111. See FLETCHER, supra note 31, at 247. 
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Aside from universalism and territorialism, there is a second dichot­
omy that is distinct from that one, yet overlaps it sufficiently to confuse 
understanding. The second dichotomy is between "ancillary" and "par­
allel" proceedings. A multinational bankruptcy must nearly always in­
volve some sort of judicial proceeding in more than one country, because 
judicial orders will be necessary to control assets during reorganization 
or liquidation. The proceeding in the debtor's home country, often 
called the "main" proceeding . . .  will always be a full bankruptcy under 
its domestic law. The judicial proceedings in other countries may be or­
dinary lawsuits, ancillary proceedings, or parallel proceedings. An ordi­
nary lawsuit may serve, for example, to gain control of a particular asset, 
but often more all-embracing solutions are required as a matter of speed 
and efficiency. In some jurisdictions those solutions will be in the form 
of an ancillary proceeding while other jurisdictions will prefer a parallel 
proceeding. An ancillary proceeding is designed primarily to aid the 
"main" proceeding in the debtor's home country. It does not contem­
plate a full administration and distribution of the debtor's local assets. 
Instead, as discussed infra, the court in the ancillary proceeding might is­
sue injunctions against creditor lawsuits and seizures and provide a for­
eign administrator with assistance in gaining information about local as­
sets.112 
By contrast, a "parallel" proceeding is a full bankruptcy under domes­
tic law. The court in a parallel proceeding administers the debtor's lo­
cal assets in parallel with the administration in the main proceeding. 
The court in a parallel proceeding will generally have control over the 
debtor's domestic assets and over creditor actions by virtue of the 
usual stays and other powers available in the domestic bankruptcy law, 
so the relief available to an administrator acting in the main proceed­
ing will be in the nature of cooperation. 
Modified universalism is the approach that I have suggested as an 
interim or transitional solution. I believe that the "cooperative territo­
rialism" proposed by Professor LoPucki in his Cornell article is one 
form of modified territorialism. The operation of modified univer­
salism is illustrated by In re Culmer,113 one of the leading cases decided 
under section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code. There, a Bahamian corpo­
ration had assets in the United States and creditors had attached those 
assets, giving them certain priority rights under United States law. 
The Bahamian liquidators brought a petition under section 304 seek­
ing a stay of the United States collection actions and turnover of the 
assets for distribution in the Bahamian proceeding. That they suc­
ceeded in both requests reflected the court's universalist view: be­
cause the Bahamian action satisfied the statute's choice-of-forum 
112. ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 11-12. 
113. 25 B.R 621, 629 (Banicr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). The case law under section 304 is dis­
cussed infra at note 197. 
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rule,114 ancillary relief was indicated. The universalist perspective was 
emphasized by the fact that the relief included turnover of assets, in 
effect dispatching the creditors to the Bahamas to assert their claims. 
On the other hand, the court did not grant the relief until it had satis­
fied itself that Bahamian law could be trusted to be fair and was in 
general terms similar to United States law. That inquiry justifies the 
adjective "modified," because the deference to the preferred univer­
salist forum was not automatic, but required a practical finding of fair­
ness and rough similarity. Presumably, a court committed to coopera­
tive territorialism would have denied the petition, leaving the 
liquidators or other creditors to bring a full parallel United States 
bankruptcy, in which the court might cooperate on some level with the 
foreign court, but only within limits ensuring that creditors in the 
United States proceeding were given first access to the United States 
assets.115 
The key difference between the two approaches is that modified 
universalism takes a worldwide perspective, seeking solutions that 
come as close as possible to the ideal of a single-court, single-law 
resolution, while territorialism of any sort seems to me to be defined 
by a conviction that local creditors have vested rights in whatever as­
sets can be seized by their courts when insolvency looms. The first 
formulation of modified universalism described it thusly: 
[Modified universalism] accepts the central premise of universalism, that 
assets should be collected and distributed on a worldwide basis, but re­
serves to local courts discretion to evaluate the fairness of the home­
country procedures and to protect the interests of local creditors. The 
leading example is Section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code . . .  .116 
If the worldwide perspective is the appropriate one for a worldwide 
market, the view adopted by the ALI,117 then merely adding a hopeful 
gloss of cooperation to a territorial system will not do. The reason is 
that cooperation will be greatly limited by the rigidities of the domes­
tic bankruptcy laws of each country. For example, once a full bank­
ruptcy is opened in a country, its local law tends to establish strict rules 
on priority and the priority systems in each country differ greatly.118 
The consequences are described in the ALI statement: 
114. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) (2000) (defining a foreign proceeding in terms of indicia of 
the center of the debtor's business for the purpose of ancillary relief under section 304). 
115. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 748-51. 
116. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 
BROOK. J. INT'LL. 499, 517 (1991). 
117. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 39 (discussing "General Principle V: Sharing 
of Value"). 
118. See generally JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, UNIVERSAL PARTICIPATION IN 
TRANSNATIONAL BANKRUPTCIES, MAKING COMMERCIAL LAW, EsSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
ROY GOODE 419 (Ross Cranston ed., 1997); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universal Priorities, 
33 TEX. INT'LL.J. 27 (1998). 
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Distribution in bankruptcy rests on a body of substantive rules central to 
the process in each country . . . . In a transnational case, each court that 
is making a distribution in a local bankruptcy proceeding must apply its 
national distribution rules, including rules as to security and other priori­
ties. In each country, those rules are relatively inflexible in liquidation 
cases. The national rules may leave more room for accommodation and 
compromise in reorganization proceedings, but they still impose signifi­
cant legal constraints. 
The difficulties created by differing priority systems constitute one of 
the major complications of parallel proceedings. A creditor or group of 
creditors that is the beneficiary of a domestic priority may assert that this 
right to priority in distribution must trump an effort at cooperation, 
whether it be cooperation in a plan of reorganization, by transfer of as­
sets, or otherwise. Such assertions could block any important attempt at 
cooperation. Priority rules may be unwaivable except by unanimous 
agreement, a standard that encourages certain parties to "hold out" for 
their personal advantage despite agreement among the great majority of 
creditors, both privileged and general.119 
The inevitable consequence is that real cooperation in a territorial sys­
tem is necessarily very limited. Instead, recoveries will turn on the for­
tuitous or manipulated location of assets and the results will be highly 
unpredictable ex ante. Modified universalism attempts to achieve 
some of the benefits of universalism in a multi-forum, multi-law world. 
It requires each court to become part of an international system for 
maximizing value and fairness in the management of the default. In 
either an ancillary or parallel approach under national law, modified 
universalism permits the court to view the default and its resolution 
(liquidation or reorganization) from a worldwide perspective and to 
cooperate with other courts to produce results as close to those that 
would arise from a single proceeding as local law will permit.120 Be­
cause it will develop experience, methods, and precedents through 
such cooperation, modified universalism will provide essential back­
ground for the development of a convention establishing a universalist 
system. In the meantime, modified universalism is an awkward, in­
terim solution. I hope to show in the next part, to paraphrase 
Churchill, that it is the worst transitional system, except for all the 
others.121 
119. ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 116. 
120. See In re Maxwell Communications, Inc., 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996). 
121. See WINSTON CHuRCHILL, Speech in the House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), re­
printed in 7 WINSTON s. CHuRCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES 1897-1963, at 7566 (Robert 
Rhodes James ed., 1974) ("Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in 
this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it 
has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms 
that have been tried from time to time."). 
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ill. AN APPRECIATION AND CRITIQUE OF OTHER VIEWS 
A. Professor Rasmussen 
Professor Rasmussen is not only an accomplished scholar, but a 
kind of universalist, so I naturally find things to admire in his contrac­
tual-menu approach to international insolvency. He proposes adop­
tion of a single insolvency law worldwide, as I do,122 although he does 
not propose a single court system to administer it. Just as I would en­
vision my ideal bankruptcy law being internationalized, he envisions 
taking to an international level the contractual-menu approach to 
bankruptcy that he has advocated domestically. Each company would 
be free to select a bankruptcy regime to govern it in case of its general 
default. The choice would be made in its articles of incorporation and 
would be unchangeable without the approval of its creditors. I would 
suppose he would favor a privatized administration to go with the pri­
vatized provisions of his insolvency menu, perhaps in the form of arbi­
tral tribunals. 
One of the attractive elements in Professor Rasmussen's approach 
is that he does not forget that government will have to enforce the re­
gime he proposes. Another attractive element is that the lawmaker's 
job is very simple. Thus, an international convention would presuma­
bly provide that all the contracting countries would enforce the re­
quirement that every company's article of incorporation contain a 
choice-of-bankruptcy procedure from the menu and that the choice 
could not be changed without the agreement of every creditor. Each 
state would further agree to enforce the choice made. This proposal 
would create a great many transitional problems with countries that 
had not adopted the convention, but that is true of every proposal.123 
With regard to Professor Rasmussen's criticism of a non­
contractual universalism, his arguments are similar to those he has di­
rected at the domestic bankruptcy system. They rest almost entirely 
on the claim that parties will contract around any set of rules and the 
result must therefore be inefficient. To that extent, he joins many oth­
ers in giving us Coase Without Costs, ignoring the possibility that the 
rules may create a system that is sufficiently close to the most efficient 
possible that it is not worthwhile to contract around it or that it is 
122. Although Professor Rasmussen tucks this point into a footnote, he there concedes 
that it would be difficult to gain enforcement of his menu approach without an international 
agreement on the menu options. See Rasmussen, A New Approach, supra note 29, at 26 
n.120. In fact, I say with some confidence that the menu approach is highly unlikely to be 
accepted without an international agreement on options. Absent such agreement, there 
would be a very complex and likely unworkable checkboard pattern of enforcement. Thus, I 
address the proposal in terms of such an agreement. 
123. I would assert that universalism would create fewer transitional problems, espe­
cially in a world that has embraced modified universalism, but I will not pursue that point 
here. 
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worthwhile to do so in few enough cases that the default position cre­
ates more efficiency than it obstructs. 
Because Professor Rasmussen's proposal essentially represents a 
translation of his general contractual-bankruptcy theories to an inter­
national level, a full statement of my objections to it would be a full­
blown critique of his theoretical approach, which would take me too 
far afield in this article. I will address, however, two objections that 
have particular saliency internationally. 
All contractual approaches to law rest on the basic argument that, 
assuming a perfect market and no transaction costs, parties will always 
adopt the most efficient bargain. Therefore, any legal constraint on 
that bargain must be irrelevant or inefficient. The constraint is irrele­
vant to the extent it permits the bargain to be struck, and inefficient to 
the extent it changes the terms of the private bargain. In the debtor­
creditor context, this syllogism supports a bankruptcy law that has lit­
tle or no content, except to enforce the bargain between the parties. 
In very brief summary, two of the key flaws in any contractual ap­
proach are lack of asset control (including protection of creditor pri­
ority) and the difficulty of disclosure (or "transparency"). These two 
flaws are especially important in the international context, so I will 
discuss them here. Both of them are correctable only if the contrac­
tual-menu is linked to an enforceable security interest, an interest that 
is very difficult to obtain internationally. 
1. Asset Control 
The first point is that any contractual approach to bankruptcy, in­
cluding the menu, has no benefit unless the bargain is enforceable. 
The bargain is unlikely to be enforceable, however, unless coupled 
with a security interest. That fact leads to one of the most fundamen­
tal criticisms of any contractual approach to bankruptcy: that ap­
proach represents only a variant on the secured credit device and a 
minor one at that. Even Professor Rasmussen's contractual-menu ap­
proach, arguably the most plausible of these concepts, is subject to this 
critique.124 
A debtor-creditor bargain can be highly protected by a dominant 
security interest125 coupled with appropriate contractual covenants. 
124. As Professor LoPucki puts it, bankrupt debtors "may breach their contracts with 
impunity." LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 71, at 2235. Of course, that is not 
true if the contract is supported by a security interest. 
125. By a dominant security interest, I mean either a blanket lien over substantially all 
the debtor's assets or a security interest in key assets which are difficult to replace, without 
which the debtor cannot function effectively, and which give a significant measure of control 
over cash flow. See generally Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 625 (1997) [hereinafter Mann, Secured Credit]. For example, the typical sin­
gle-asset real estate case would satisfy criteria one and two, but would satisfy three only 
where rents are held to be cash collateral. See, e.g., Glenn R. Schmitt, The Continuing Con· 
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Any bargain protected by such an interest has little to fear from bank­
ruptcy.126 The bankruptcy menu can offer little additional advantage 
beyond the security interest itself. On the other hand, where a credi­
tor lacks sufficient bargaining power to negotiate such a lien,127 any 
bankruptcy-menu bargain will be largely unenforceable in the context 
of general default, the bankruptcy context.128 The reason is that any 
system that does not control the debtor's assets cannot protect the par­
ties' bargain against debtor manipulation. It is all too easy for the 
debtor to use transfers to subsidiaries and affiliates, among many other 
devices, to undo the benefits for which the creditor has bargained. 
The legal mechanisms for preventing inappropriate asset transfers -
notably fraudulent conveyance and preference rules - are clumsy and 
operate effectively only after the point of demonstrable insolvency in 
the period just prior to a formal bankruptcy. 
Without the asset control provided by an effective system of secu­
rity-interest enforcement, ex ante efficiencies cannot be obtained by 
bargaining over bankruptcy alternatives because the bargains cannot 
be enforced. 
2. Disclosure 
The second major problem with any contractual approach to bank­
ruptcy, domestically and internationally, is the issue of disclosure: 
fusion Over Real Property Rents As Cash Collateral In Bankruptcy: The Need for A Consis­
tent Interpretation, 5 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 1 (1992/1993). 
126. Without writing the article here, I note that a creditor who can prevent use of the 
debtor's assets to administer the case (including paying the lawyers) can be quite sure of 
lifting the automatic stay quickly in almost all cases, rendering the bankruptcy irrelevant 
from the creditor's point of view. There may be a handful of cases in which that cannot be 
done. One instance is where there is too little at stake to make a lift-stay motion worthwhile. 
It is true that in some circumstances in certain systems a bankruptcy petition may pro­
duce delay even for a creditor holding a valid security interest. That can happen in the 
United States, for example. Even if we had no bankruptcy system at all, such delays might 
result from a debtor's preliminary injunction litigation against foreclosure or other devices. 
Secured creditors are naive if they can imagine a world in which there are no delays or costs 
for such creditors in a general default. 
127. To say much the same thing in efficiency language, the costs to a debtor of granting 
a security interest may exceed the savings the debtor receives in the form of a lower interest 
rate and other favorable terms. The primary reason is that the security interest represents a 
substantial transfer of control over the debtor's assets to the creditor, especially if it is a 
"dominant security interest." Mann, Secured Credit, supra note 125, at 665, 668. The debtor 
(or its management) may conclude that the cost in lost business flexibility exceeds any sav­
ings the bargain enables the creditor to offer in exchange. This point is central to the on­
going debate about security interests, but it can only be mentioned here. 
128. I do not mean to suggest that a security interest over some specific asset will have 
no value to a creditor in such a circumstance, but only that it will be insufficient to enforce 
the overall bankruptcy-menu bargain, because of the debtor's capacity to manipulate all the 
uncontrolled assets. 
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How will creditors, even adjusting creditors,129 know and understand 
the bankruptcy configuration of the entity with whom they are deal­
ing?130 Will acquiring that information impose unacceptable transac­
tion costs?131 Professor LoPucki has done an excellent analysis of 
these and other difficulties that face contractual theories with regard 
to disclosure. I will rest on that analysis for the proposition that the 
contractual-menu approach creates serious and intractable problems 
of transparency. As with asset control, only linkage with a security in­
terest in an Article 9 type system of public registration could solve this 
problem. 
3. Security as a Solution 
One can imagine globalization leading to a system in which default 
is administered through a single secured-creditor system.132 Article 9 
presents elegant solutions to the problems of priorities vis-a-vis the 
rights of third parties and its public-registration system effectively ad­
dresses the disclosure issue. If one were to adopt a privatized, contrac­
tual system for managing global defaults, Article 9 is the obvious 
model with which to begin fashioning such a system, because it solves 
the two central problems not solved by mere contractual-bankruptcy 
approaches. Importantly, it is a system that has been tested over many 
decades in highly successful economies. 
Of course, the proposal of such a system would require addressing 
the decades-long debate in the United States and elsewhere concern­
ing the efficiency and fairness of a secured-credit system,133 especially 
one that effectively would pre-empt traditional bankruptcy laws as the 
mechanism for managing a general default. Furthermore, because 
such a system would be designed to manage general defaults, the tradi­
tional job of bankruptcy laws, it would have to be symmetrical with the 
global market and therefore would have to be adopted globally. 
Yet to solve the problem with a secured-credit system is even more 
difficult internationally. A number of efforts have been under way for 
some time to try to achieve international agreement with respect to se­
cured credit, but all are experiencing serious obstacles. There are a 
number of countries that have substantial reservations about granting 
unlimited first priority to security interests and there are a number 
129. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Se­
cured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996) (introducing the term "adjusting 
creditor"). 
130. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 71, at 2246-47. 
131. See id. 
132 See supra note 125 for elucidation of a "dominant" security interest. 
133. See Mann, Secured Credit, supra note 125. 
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that favor priority, but are not prepared to accept the United States 
approach to registration and disclosure of security interests.134 
The notion of using security interests in a single-creditor or syndi­
cated-creditor approach to financing as a solution to the problem of a 
general default may be the most plausible alternative to universalism 
in the sense I use the term. If a single-creditor system would achieve 
our goals, the bankruptcy-menu approach would be unnecessary. If 
agreement on the role of security interests (asset control, priority, and 
disclosure) cannot be achieved, the bankruptcy-menu approach cannot 
be successful either. The point is not merely a question of political dif­
ficulty. In my view, the contractual-menu approach has been useful as 
an analytic tool,135 but our development of a theoretical model at the 
international level will require us to proceed in a different direction. 
B. Professor LoPucki 
1. Generally 
Professor LoPucki's Cornell article is, as usual, full of ideas that are 
contrarian, surprising, interesting, and useful.136 That article is devoted 
in large part to critiquing my position, which is flattering, under the 
heading "universalism," which is misleading. The problem is that Pro­
fessor LoPucki conflates two perspectives: a theoretical world of in­
ternational agreement embodied in an agreed international conven­
tion and the current world as it is, semi-globalized and highly 
uncoordinated. Professor LoPucki criticizes universalism as if it were 
applied in the current world, while comparing it to a coordinated terri­
torialism achieved under a global convention in a world ready to come 
to such an agreement. The defect in the comparison is like describing 
the difficulties of a 747 landing in the wilderness and then comparing 
its performance with a DC3 touching down at Heathrow. The fault 
may be mine, for having extolled the benefits of the long-term solu­
tion, universalism, while focusing my detailed analysis on modified 
universalism, a transitional rule. Because universalism has been so 
widely accepted in academic circles, I have been guilty of failing to 
present it adequately at the theoretical level. I will therefore compare 
theoretical, future universalism as I have described it above with Pro-
134. See 1997 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade L.Y.B. 27, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/434, para. 248, 
containing the report of the meeting of the Working Group on International Contract Prac­
tices of UNCITRAL in November 1996. The current version of the draft Convention pre­
pared by the Secretariat is contained in the Convention on Assignment in Receivables Fi­
nancing, 1998 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade L.Y.B. 28, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IJ/WP.96. See 
also Spiro V. Bazinas, An International Legal Regime for Receivables Financing: 
UNCITRAL's Contribution, 8 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'LL. 315 (1998). 
135. I am tempted to say "heuristic," but I promised Mom I would not. 
136. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra· note 30. 
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fessor LoPucki's theoretical, "conventionalized" territorialism as pre­
sented in his widely read article in the Cornell Law Review.131 I will 
then compare modified universalism with the current system of terri­
torialism. In both comparisons, universalism is the better system. 
For clarity, the analysis starts with a single multinational corporate 
debtor, postponing the problem of corporate groups until the basics 
have been established. 
"Cooperative territorialism" as proposed by Professor LoPucki in 
his Cornell article is a system in which each country exercises jurisdic­
tion over the assets within its de facto power, without regard to legal 
concepts of jurisdiction.138 Its courts manage and distribute those as­
sets in accordance with the national priority system with complete 
freedom to deny priority treatment to "foreign" creditors (however 
"foreign" might be defined139).140 Where in a particular case it would 
be useful to cooperate - his example is in a joint sale of an asset 
package situated in two countries - the national courts would coop­
erate. The various avoiding powers would be applied to transfers of 
assets that were in the de facto power of a given court at the time of 
the transfer to be attacked.141 The court would apply its local avoid­
ance law.142 
Professor LoPucki's territorial system is made cooperative and co­
herent through adoption of a convention, but it retains most of the 
disadvantages of any territorial system. Its fundamental flaw is that no 
national bankruptcy law is symmetrical with a global market. For the 
reasons mentioned earlier, no system of managing a general default 
can be effective unless it is symmetrical with the market. For that rea­
son, countries have uniformly adopted national bankruptcy laws. 
When markets were mostly national, such a law was symmetrical with 
most of the market it governed. 
137. See id. 
138. See id. at 742-55. 
139. See infra note 191. 
140. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30. Professor LoPucki does not discuss how 
he would square this discrimination with the numerous treaties to which the United States is 
a party requiring "national treatment" for the citizens of the other treaty party. See, e.g. , 
Treaty between the United States and Israel Regarding Friendship, Commerce and Naviga­
tion, Apr. 3, 1954, 5 U.S.T. 550; Treaty between the United States and Japan Regarding 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063. I am not clear if he 
would permit the courts to subordinate "foreign" creditors to general unsecured local credi­
tors, but he would permit foreign creditors to file. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, 
at 753-54; see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotia­
tions: Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization [World Trade Organiza­
tion], Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994). 
141. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 748-49 . .  
142 See text accompanying infra notes 184-193. 
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A territorial system, being asymmetrical to a global market, has 
two serious weaknesses: the consequences of a general default depend 
upon the location of assets, and the laws of each jurisdiction differ 
greatly.143 International bankruptcy is reduced to a game of musical 
chairs in which creditors cannot know in advance where the assets of 
the debtor will be located when the music stops. These flaws produce 
three bad results: a) distribution results are unpredictable; b) the 
debtor, perhaps in collusion with a favored creditor, can engage in 
strategic behavior up to and including fraud, by manipulation of asset 
location; and c) claims must be made, and administration and litigation 
must be conducted, in multiple jurisdictions at far greater cost. By 
contrast, in a world with a universalist convention establishing one 
bankruptcy law and one court system to administer it, the law would 
be highly predictable, movement of assets would be irrelevant, and the 
entire process could be administered efficiently. The consequence 
would be a great reduction in risk premiums and transaction costs and 
a great increase in fairness and efficiency. 
To argue for territoriality as the goal of an international system is 
much the same as arguing for state-by-state bankruptcy within the 
United States. Even if there were a political case to be made for co­
operative territoriality as an interim system, such a system as a long­
term solution defies logic. For all the reasons discussed earlier, bank­
ruptcy is inherently a market-symmetrical system and such a system is 
best served by universalism. 
Territorialism is even less efficient if we consider only reorganiza­
tion. Reorganization requires a high level of cooperation to adminis­
ter and rescue a financially distressed multinational company. That is 
true whether the ultimate disposition is continuation or sale as a going 
concern. It is very difficult to engender the necessary cooperation 
among courts, given contending interests. Each court is bound by rela­
tively rigid rules governing the details of entitlements under local 
bankruptcy law. Professor LoPucki's convention would apparently 
ensure that such entitlements were honored in detail.144 For the rea­
sons explained by the ALI Principles,145 the result is to make it ex­
tremely difficult to achieve a reorganization. It has already been de­
scribed how smoothly and efficiently reorganization of a multinational 
could be achieved under a single-law, single court universalist system. 
Reorganization is modern bankruptcy law. For that reason, it is the 
focus of nearly all the reform proposals being made and adopted 
143. Nothing in Professor LoPucki's convention speaks to narrowing the differences be­
tween priority systems and other rules in each territorial enclave. On the contrary, Professor 
LoPucki wants to defend the integrity of each system's policy choices. See LoPucki, Coop­
eration, supra note 30, 751. 
144. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30. 
145. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 19. 
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around the world, from Germany to Me:xico.146 Indeed, the flexibility 
of reorganization statutes is often utilized today even where the busi­
ness is to be liquidated in one sense or another.147 To adopt territori­
alism as a long-term solution would be to leave multinational corpora­
tions mired in a liquidation-centered bankruptcy system already 
obsolete domestically. 
The territorialist system also claims as a virtue the protection of the 
social policies of each nation through local priority rules and other lo­
cal rules.148 My initial discussion of true universalism explained how 
national policies could be diverse and yet protected in a universalist 
system, just as many state-law policies are enforced routinely in 
United States bankruptcy courts.149 It also suggested that the interna­
tional bankruptcy system might be limited to large, multinational 
companies, leaving local interests to be governed by local bankruptcy 
laws and policies. On the other hand, it is true that in a universalist 
system some bankruptcy rules would be imposed at the international 
level, as they are now imposed in most nations at the national rather 
than at the regional level. That result is natural, proper, and inevitable 
in a globalizing financial and commercial system that requires an un­
derlying uniformity in the event of a multinational general default. 
Just as the free flow of goods, services, and investments in the 
American Republic required a national bankruptcy law, true global­
ization of trade and investment requires an international one. If the 
political viewpoints that would be offended by that result prevail in the 
end, then globalization will be halted in many other areas as well. 
Even in a territorial system, local policies are very difficult to apply 
to multinationals, especially in the context of insolvency and general 
default. Is a tort victim protected by a territorial system? As things 
stand now, no web of laws ensures that a dangerous foreign product 
sold in the United States is backed by either insurance or substantial 
local assets. Absent local assets, how will a territorial system of bank­
ruptcy protect the tort victim? What about the employee priority for 
repayment in bankruptcy? Would it be protected in a territorial sys­
tem? No law requires a foreign company with an American payroll to 
have sufficient funds in the United States to pay employees. Instead, 
available funds may be e-transferred out of the country to a distant 
146. Chapter 11, like the prophet, is dishonored by its local academics, but the rest of 
the world is interested and impressed. See, e.g., Insolvency Bill [H.L.], Session 1999-2000 
(2000), at <littp://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cml99900/cmbills/173/2000 
173.htm>; see also, British Review, supra note 14, at 12-13. 
147. See, e.g., In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1994), aff d, 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff d, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996) (adoption of 
worldwide plan of liquidation). 
148. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 751-52. 
149. See supra note 52. 
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bank moments before the payroll checks are processed, with no local 
assets to cover the employees. In those circumstances, only a univer­
salist procedure would have the possibility of protecting the employ­
ees. 
There is a whole legal industry devoted to helping foreign compa­
nies avoid or carefully limit their United States presence. Even "ad­
justing" creditors, like the larger suppliers, have no assurance that sub­
stantial United States assets stand behind a foreign company's 
contractual promise. Because the territorial model of business simply 
does not apply to multinational companies, the assumption that local 
policies will be less vindicated in a universalist bankruptcy system is 
highly problematic with regard to multinationals.150 
By contrast, a universalist system, marshalling a company's assets 
worldwide, could permit and enforce a limited range of agreed interna­
tional priorities. For example, a priority for employees, one found in 
most domestic bankruptcy systems, could be agreed internationally 
and would be more reliably enforced than the existing territorial pri­
orities. This example illustrates once more that globalization requires 
converging standards and that universalism is the best method for 
promoting convergence and taking advantage of its benefits. 
In every respect, then, true universalism is a better long-term goal 
than cooperative territorialism, if one assumes continued globaliza­
tion. The only basis that would remain for preferring cooperative ter­
ritorialism would be the claim that universalism cannot be achieved 
politically or would take much longer to achieve. That point is dis­
cussed below. 
2. Corporate Groups 
In comparing universalism with territorialism at the theoretical 
level, one other point made by Professor LoPucki requires attention: 
the problem of corporate groups. This problem is also far broader 
than bankruptcy. In his classic multivolume treatise, The Law of Cor­
porate Groups,151 Phillip Blumberg analyzes in detail the enormous le­
gal problems that are presented by business enterprises with a single 
direction, but infinitely multipliable legal redoubts. He suggests that 
they may have to be treated as single entities under some circum­
stances, 152 "piercing the corporate veil." It goes without saying that I 
cannot seriously address the multitude of issues presented by corpo-
150. See text accompanying infra notes 152-165. 
151. PlilLLIP I. BLUMBERG & KURT A. STRASSER, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS 
{1998). 
152 See id. at xxxix (recognizing that modem bankruptcy law often disregards the tradi­
tional rule of corporate separateness where related corporate entities have engaged in com­
plex transactions, then fallen on difficult economic times). 
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rate groups within the confines of this Article nor can the bankruptcy 
aspects of those issues be easily isolated for analysis. Nonetheless, it is 
true that bankruptcy is one of the fields in which the corporate-group 
presents a major problem internationally. Indeed, Blumberg devotes 
an entire volume to it. 
Understandably, Professor LoPucki does not attempt to answer the 
larger questions about corporate groups. Nonetheless, to use the gen­
eral problem posed by corporate groups as an argument for coopera­
tive territorialism, Professor LoPucki must show that territorialism is 
better suited to cope with the problem than is universalism. The ALI 
Statement of Principles identifies two categories of problems relating 
to corporate groups in the context of international bankruptcy.153 The 
first is group liability. The second is consolidation or coordination. 
The first implicates all the larger issues just mentioned. Although 
most countries respect the corporate form most of the time, there are 
major exceptions, not limited to the odd tort case involving a taxi 
company.154 The oft-cited instances are Deltec155 and Bhopal,156 both 
cases in which a parent company was exposed to liability for the obli­
gations of its subsidiary.157 Universalism's single court and single law 
are transparently better suited to sorting out the liability of various 
elements in a worldwide corporate group in such circumstances. 
Professor LoPucki's claim that territorialism better manages inter­
national corporate groups relates to the second problem, procedural 
consolidation and coordination. He assumes a model in which corpo­
rate groups are neatly arranged in national slots. Each country where 
the group operates has its own local corporation and all of the assets 
and liabilities relating to that country are concentrated in that local 
153. ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 96-97. 
154. See, e.g., Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 95 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding 
that a British parent company actively involved in illegal conduct in the United States was 
therefore subject to jurisdiction and, impliedly, liability). 
155. C-705-XVI. Compania Swift de La Plata S.A., Frigorifica s/ convocatoria 
acreedores. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n, Buenos Aires, 4 Sept. 1973 (Michael 
W. Gordon, trans., Argentine Jurisprudence: The Parke-Davis and De/tee Cases, 6 LAW. 
AMER. 320, 330 (1974)); see also Michael W. Gordon, Argentine Jurisprudence: De/tee Up­
date, 11 LAW. AMER. 43 (1979). 
156. See In re Union Carbide Corp., 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). Bhopal has raised one­
law, one-forum questions with respect to tort liability, human rights violations, and criminal 
liability. See id. More than 15 years after the tragedy that injured 200,000 Indians these 
questions are still being contested. See Chris Hedges, A Key Figure Proves Elusive In a U.S. 
Suit Over Bhopal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2000, at A4 (discussing recent events with respect to 
criminal proceedings in India and a human rights suit in New York related to the disaster). 
157. See Claudia M. Pardinas, The Enigma of the Legal Liability of Transnational Cor­
porations, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L LJ. 405 (1991); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Bhopal 
Symposium: Theories of Parent Company Liability and The Prospects for An International 
Settlement, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321 (1985); Lisa Mosca ti Hawkes, Note, Parens Patriae and the 
Union Carbide Case: The Disaster at Bhopal Continues, 21 CORNELLINT'LL.J. 181 (1988). 
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corporation.158 The company then files a local bankruptcy and the lo­
cal court administers the local assets for the benefit of the local credi­
tors under the local law, perhaps with some measure of practical coop­
eration with the courts in other countries. Having constructed a 
perfectly territorial model, he makes a reasonable argument that a ter­
ritorial legal regime best suits it. Here my dispute with him is primar­
ily empirical. Although there are few data,159 my sense is that the 
model is so far from the reality as to offer little support for the territo­
rial view. In fact, many companies operate directly, rather than 
through subsidiaries, in countries outside of their country of incorpo­
ration or principal place of business. It is also common to establish a 
subsidiary in one country that serves regional purposes and has assets 
and liabilities all over a region. Even where first or second tier sub­
sidiaries are established in each country of operation, it is often the 
case that the assets and operations are not maintained territorially, but 
are scattered around the corporate family, globally or regionally.160 
The companies in the corporate group regularly transfer assets among 
themselves for business and tax reasons as part of global cash man­
agement programs and in the course of inter-group politics. They also 
exchange cross-guarantees to third parties for the obligations of the 
parent and affiliates. Then there is fraud: moving assets across bor­
ders precisely to confuse and obfuscate. In short, the reality for most 
multinationals is a complicated mass of assets and liabilities sprawled 
across borders, not a neat territorial division. The corporate-group 
problem greatly complicates international bankruptcy issues. It does 
not make them territorial. 
Take, for example, a multinational case in which some assets are in 
Mexico. The territorialist claim would be that the Mexican courts can 
simply dispose of the Mexican assets.161 Such a claim assumes a simple 
territorial reality that is counterfactual. If the standard for determin­
ing that an asset is Mexican is a legal one, like "jurisdiction," then 
there will be many potential conflicts of jurisdictional decisions in a 
territorial system. If the standard is raw power to control assets, there 
will be equal room for conflict, with even more serious consequences. 
158. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 751. 
159. Here a marvelous empirical project awaits a young law or finance professor, in­
volving a good deal of travel, much of it to sun-drenched islands. Pending that study, I prof­
fer in support of my view of the facts, for what it is worth, eleven years in international prac­
tice. I was a partner in a firm called Surrey & Morse (now part of Jones, Day, Reavis, and 
Pogue) and my practice was largely devoted to litigation and transactions involving multina­
tionals around the world. 
160. Because these subsidiaries often have no business reality, it is hard to get business 
people to make reality congruent with the legal fiction. Exemplary of the point in text is the 
Maxwell situation. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons o/Maxwell Communications, 
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2531 (1996) [hereinafter Westbrook, Lessons]. 
161. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 71, at 2234. 
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Suppose a bank account in the New York branch of a London bank 
held in the name of a Mexican corporation. The traditional, fictional 
choice-of-law rule would choose New York law as goveming,162 but 
there is a substantial argument that the worldwide bank has the ulti­
mate obligation to pay.163 Thus the New York and English courts 
would have quite plausible claims to jurisdiction over the account on 
those grounds, while the Mexican bankruptcy court would be follow­
ing another established doctrine by asserting jurisdiction over the ac­
count by virtue of a worldwide in rem jurisdiction over all of its 
debtor's property. As to power, both New York and London would 
have contempt power over the bank, while Mexico could order the 
debtor's officers to comply under pain of contempt.164 Which court 
can "claim" the bank account under a territorial system? All three can 
do so. The bank and the debtor may well be subject to conflicting or­
ders. Many other examples are available in a globalizing world in 
which attempts to assign assets, liabilities, and operations to particular 
territories are increasingly futile in every case that matters. 
There can be little doubt that the problem of the legal responsibil­
ity of corporate groups will be addressed as the world continues to 
globalize. The general pressures for convergence already discussed 
will operate here as well. The operations of multinationals create 
grave policy problems for nation states and a serious legal problem for 
every person in a nation state who relies upon a territorial legal re­
gime. For a tort victim or a small supplier, the risk of inefficiency and 
injustice because of an injury by one soldier in a multinational corpo­
rate army is substantial. The territorial system offers little defense. 
Even for contract creditors, the difficulty of identifying clearly the 
corporate actor with whom one is contracting, much less the laws that 
might apply to that actor's conduct, make such contracting expensive 
(because of the cost of information acquisition and the need for multi­
ple solutions to bargaining issues) and the results unpredictable. 
These problems will continue to haunt all areas of commercial and 
business life in a globalizing world, from securities regulation to anti­
trust to bankruptcy. Territorialism is less able to cope with them pre­
cisely because it turns upon a territorial model of economic conduct 
that is outdated on its way to obsolete. On the other hand, the steady 
162 See REsTATEMENT {FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 416, 369 (1934) (reflecting 
territorial view that the law of the place of payment governs liability for non-payment of ob­
ligations); Zimmerman v. Sutherland, 274 U.S. 253, 255-56 (1927) (stating that the liability of 
a bank for an obligation is governed by the law of the place where payment on the obligation 
was to be made, in this case Austria-Hungary). 
163. See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 495 U.S. 660 (1990) (recognizing 
the possibility that the debt of a Philippine branch could be recovered from the general as­
sets of a New York bank). 
164. I use the term "contempt" to embrace any judicial remedy for violation of court 
orders. 
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pressure for universalist solutions in all these commercial fields will in­
teract with those in bankruptcy to evolve efficient answers.165 
3. Lesser Universalism 
Because a truly universalist system may be many years away, it is 
appropriate to touch briefly upon lesser versions of universalism that 
would represent a substantial improvement on the ad hoc system of 
modified universalism or any form of territorialism. 
a. Single Court, National Laws. The point was made earlier that a 
lesser form of universalism could be achieved by a single court system 
applying national bankruptcy laws. I will call such a system a "single­
court" universalism. The single court would choose a single national 
bankruptcy law to apply in each case. It would choose the law to apply 
pursuant to an internationally agreed choice-of-law rule. This system 
would not be as good as true universalism. There would be a lower 
level of predictability because the single court would not have a single 
international bankruptcy law to apply. The choice-of-law decisions 
would multiply and grow greatly in complexity.166 It would still be true 
that a single court system applying only two sets of choice-of-law rules 
(one for bankruptcy law and one for nonbankruptcy law) would, over 
time, produce results far more predictable than those obtainable in 
multiple tribunals. 
Nonetheless, this point is one that greatly concerns Professor 
LoPucki, because of his conviction that the proper choice-of-law rule 
would be difficult to establish and enforce and would be subject to 
strategic manipulation.167 The reason is that he believes it is impossi­
ble to state a workable conflicts rule designating the bankruptcy law of 
a company's home country as controlling. He believes one cannot use 
the company's state of incorporation because it is too subject to ma­
nipulation nor its principle place of business, because it is too hard to 
determine. Although he does not address this problem in the context 
165. This Article would grow much bigger if these issues were discussed. For example, 
one could easily envision a system in which every corporate group, as defined, would be re­
quired to register ( incorporate) in a country that it can demonstrate is an important center of 
its activities and to disclose that registration in its stationery, invoices, advertising, web sites, 
emails, and other business co=unications. Then an international rule or a choice-of-law 
rule could be tied to that location. Many other solutions are available as well, each with its 
own difficulties. 
166. As with our current nonsystem internationally, the combination of choice-of­
bankruptcy law and choice-of-nonbankruptcy law interacting as to each dispute multiplies 
the plausible alternative outcomes. 
167. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 720, 729. Actually, Professor LoPucki 
focuses upon the problem in the context of the choice-of-forum issue, but the questions are 
much the same. 
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of a global convention specifying the relevant standard, it seems clear 
he does not believe that a workable standard can be articulated.168 
I agree that the law of the place of incorporation is unsatisfactory 
because of the risk of sham incorporation - a company organized un­
der a flag of convenience unrelated to the location of its business, 
management, and assets. Professor LoPucki, however, is also not sat­
isfied with a "principal place of business" or "center of main interests" 
standard. He argues that such a standard is hopelessly imprecise and 
will lead to much litigation and inconsistent decisions. Yet the princi­
pal place of business standard in one formulation or another is com­
monplace throughout American law - state and federal169 - and is 
found elsewhere as well.170 That sort of standard has produced some 
litigation, but I am unaware of any widely held view that it is so impre­
cise as to be impractical or to maim any important legal objective. The 
center-of-main-interests standard was adopted in the EU Conven­
tion171 and the Model Law,172 with no substantial claim asserted that 
the standard was too difficult to enforce. A similar standard has been 
applied by the United States courts in applying section 304 of the 
Bankruptcy Code in the choice of forum context without provoking 
substantial litigation.173 It is unclear why great difficulty should be an­
ticipated for it in the context of a bankruptcy convention, especially if 
it is applied by a single court system around the world. 
168. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 718. 
169. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(l) (1994) ("[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a 
citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its princi­
pal place of business."). This standard has given rise to a certain amount of controversy, but 
has remained in place because it is reasonably workable. See John B. Oakley, Prospectus 
For The American Law Institute's Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 855, 882-84 (1998) (discussing the controversy regarding interpretation of this clause at 
the federal level, but concluding that sufficient consensus has been reached among courts to 
prevent raising the issue in the ALI revision). Consider also the "chief executive office" 
standard in § 9-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(d) (1994); 8 
Hawkland U.C.C. Series (West Group) § 9-103:9 (1997) (collecting cases that discuss the 
"chief executive office" standard). 
170. See, e.g., Canadian Statement, supra note 7, at 118 (explaining that Canadian law 
applies a chief place of business standard to choose the law applicable to security interests in 
mobile goods and intangibles); Kamlah, supra note 4 (explaining that the new German bank­
ruptcy code utilizes a center of main interests standard). 
171. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commer­
cial Matters, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 32, 29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990) [hereinafter Brussels Convention]. 
172. MODEL LAW, supra note 16, at IV.31. 
173. Section 304 permits deference to a "foreign proceeding." Section 101 of the Bank­
ruptcy Code defines such a proceeding: " 'foreign proceeding' means proceeding, whether 
judicial or administrative and whether or not under bankruptcy law, in a foreign country in 
which the debtor's domicile, residence, principal place of business, or principal assets were 
located at the commencement of such proceeding, for the purpose of liquidating an estate, 
adjusting debts by composition, extension, or discharge, or effecting a reorganization." 11 
u.s.c. § 101(23) (1994). 
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Furthermore, it is not necessary to assume a raw, unsophisticated 
choice between place of incorp9ration anc;l principal place of business 
in choosing a choice-of-law rule for an international convention in a 
globalizing world. For one thing, the choice may be multidimensional. 
The Model Law provides that the place of incorporation is presumed 
to be the center of the debtor's main interests.174 It would be a short 
step to make that presumption rebuttable only by a clear showing that 
the center was elsewhere. A naked incorporation in a sun-drenched 
bank haven would fall easily before proof of the actual center of the 
business, while a multiply-centered business incorporated under the 
law of any of its centers would be easily "centered" for bankruptcy 
purposes. Any law professor can then devise the marginal hypotheti­
cal where the plant is in Chicago, while the CEO, one secretary, and a 
fax machine actually reside on the sun-drenched isle, but the marginal 
cases will be few. Resolved in a single court, they would present little 
practical difficulty across the run of cases. The specification of court 
jurisdiction in the highly successful Brussels Convention serves as an 
excellent early model for this sort of international rulemaking in the 
context of a single-court, referred-question system.175 The model 
would work as well for choice of law, even though it is somewhat more 
complicated than choice of forum. 
b. Single Law, National Courts. Another lesser form of univer­
salism might consist of a single international bankruptcy law enforced 
by national courts, which I will call a "single law" system. Such a sys­
tem would be the mirror-image of the single-court system. The rule 
for selecting the primary court to administer a general default, with 
other courts serving in an ancillary role, would likely be one of the 
variants just discussed. For the same reasons, there should not be 
great difficulty in identifying the proper court to play the primary role. 
174. See Ulrik Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen, Asset Distribution in Transnational Insol­
vencies: Combining Predictability and Protection of Local Interests, 13 AM. BANKR. L.J. 385, 
419 (1999) ("According to the UNCITRAL Cross-Border Insolvency Model Law Article 
16(3), the center of the debtor's main interest is presUilled to be the debtor's registered of­
fice . . . .  "). 
175. See Brussels Convention, supra note 171. For a general discussion of the conven­
tion today, see Robert C. Reuland, The Recognition of Judgments in the European Commu­
nity: The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Brussels Convention, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 559 
(1993); see also Patrick J. Borchers, Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United States and 
the European Community: Lessons for American Reform, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 121, 138-43 
(1992) (criticizing some aspects of the Brussels Convention, but still offering it as a model 
preferable to American constitutionalizing of jurisdiction); Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Un­
fit for Globetrotting, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1027, 1039 (1995) (although criticizing the 
Brussels Convention's treatment of non-signatories, agreeing that it's approach to personal 
jurisdiction issues could be an effective model for shaping U.S. law); Russell J. Weintraub, 
How Substantial Is Our Need for a Judgments-Recognition Convention and What Should We 
Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 167, 167-68 (1998) (suggesting that the 
Brussels Convention offers an excellent model on which to base negotiations for a new 
judgments convention). 
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If a single international bankruptcy law were administered by multiple 
national tribunals, many of the benefits described above would be re­
duced or eliminated, but the results would nonetheless be more uni­
form, more predictable, more efficient, and more fair than would be 
possible using national bankruptcy laws. 
In either system of lesser universalism, the manager of a reorgan­
izing business (corporate management or an appointed trustee )176 
would have one court to supervise the worldwide restructuring of the 
business. That result alone would make even these lesser forms of 
universalism superior to territorialism, where reorganization efforts on 
a transnational basis would remain difficult or impossible, as explained 
above. 
c. Multiple Law and Courts. The final alternative would be a 
multilaw, multicourt convention that had only a choice-of-law rule and 
a choice-of-court rule. That system would be better than we have 
now, because the governing rules would be adopted at the interna­
tional level and binding on all the contracting parties, but it would be 
far short of true universalism. It is difficult to say if it should be con­
sidered as the lowest form of universalism or the highest form of the 
transitional solution, modified universalism. 
d. Bankruptcy as Part of a Converging and Internationalizing Legal 
World. These systems regulating international bankruptcy will not 
evolve in a vacuum. As the EU example demonstrates, a globalizing 
world will generate increasing pressures for predictable international 
rules in a number of areas relating to commerce. Transnational busi­
ness will demand to be regulated (or deregulated) at an international 
level.177 Although many areas will remain governed by national laws, 
some level of predictability, or even uniformity, will be required to ac­
commodate the growing globalization of business enterprise. That ac­
commodation can be achieved in three ways: sufficient convergence of 
national laws (as in the uniform-law movement within the United 
States), adoption of an international substantive rule, or adoption of 
an international choice-of-law, choice-of-forum rule. Specific solu­
tions may combine these approaches, achieving a "one-law, one­
forum" solution.178 
Universalist bankruptcy will be one important example, but only 
one, of a one-law, one-forum solution. Securities regulation, antitrust 
176. In the United States and a number of other countries, the debtor remains in posses­
sion in a reorganization. See IMF Report, supra note 2, at 57-58. In many other countries, 
the creditors or a court appoint a trustee to take over the management of a reorganizing 
company. See id. 
177. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Extraterritoriality, Conflicts of Laws, and the Regula· 
tion of Transnational Business, 25 TEX. INT'LL.J. 71 {1990). 
178. Ultintately, the point is achieving an international regime for business, whether 
than regime is substantively regulatory or deregulatory. See id. 
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enforcement, and environmental laws are already farther along in 
some respects than bankruptcy. The EU example suggests that bank­
ruptcy will be more difficult than most others and slower in coming. 
For the reasons indicated above, the convergence approach alone can­
not work efficiently for the collective device that is bankruptcy be­
cause of the need for market symmetry. The result must be the slow 
process of evolution of an international regime or an international rule 
that chooses predictably the applicable local regime. A combination 
of the two - the former applied to as-defined large multinationals and 
the latter for local enterprises - is a definite possibility. Also quite 
possible is a combination of international and national solutions in a 
single-court or a single-law system, as has just been described. 
For present purposes, the point is that in a globalizing world there 
will be many occasions other than bankruptcy to deal with issues like 
sham incorporation and multiple business centers. Tax issues, labor 
regulations, trade preferences, and a host of other questions will re­
quire either an international legal regime or rules "centering" a busi­
ness for legal purposes or both. It is more than likely that these con­
verging requirements will solve, or set up for solution, the one-law, 
one-forum problem for bankruptcy as well.179 
4. Transitional Rules 
Having done me the favor of forcing me to articulate the argu­
ments for universalism as the proper theoretical and long-term solu­
tion, Professor LoPucki has granted me the further courtesy in this 
symposium of conceding that I am right.180 He is prepared to narrow 
the argument to the best system for transition. I am convinced that 
modified universalism is the best transitional rule, because it moves us 
in the right direction - toward true universalism - and provides the 
essential experience to inform the fashioning of a multinational bank­
ruptcy convention when that time comes. It also permits flexible, 
pragmatic decisions to be made in the here and now that enable par­
ties to obtain some portion of the benefits of universalism. 
A transitional rule must satisfy two requirements. Like all rules, it 
should produce the fairest and most efficient results possible. In addi­
tion, it should assist, rather than retard, the transition to the long-term 
rule that will produce the best results. To the extent that the two ob­
jectives conflict, we should aim for a sensible balance. 
We start with the issue of the best rule for current results, the heart 
of Professor LoPucki's argument. Realizing that cooperation is essen-
179. See supra text accompanying note 165. 
180. Such a concession marks the mature and secure scholar. However, Professor 
LoPucki insists it will be "decades if not centuries" before universalism can be installed, a 
view I regard as far too pessimistic. See supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text. 
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tial to the fairest and most efficient results, Professor LoPucki argues 
for a "cooperative" territorialism, which is not quite an oxymoron, at 
least as a transitional rule. The difficulty is that Professor LoPucki's 
proposal simply exchanges one set of legal problems for another, while 
making cooperation much less likely. As noted above,181 assets and 
operations do not fall neatly into territorial boxes. Under Professor 
LoPucki's approach, each national forum must decide which assets are 
part of its jurisdiction, but it will routinely be the case that more than 
one forum can fairly claim jurisdiction as to various assets. He has ex­
changed one difficult choice-of-forum problem for many such prob­
lems. Attempts to cooperate in the face of these conflicting claims will 
be very difficult. That difficulty will be increased by Professor 
LoPucki's insistence on "protection" of every arguable right of a local 
creditor (however "local creditor" may be defined in a globalizing 
world).182 
He has seriously complicated the choice-of-law problem in the bar­
gain, because a territorial system requires that many courts decide 
what law applies to various assets and transactions rather than having 
most, if not all, of those decisions concentrated in the main proceed­
ing. Thus we could look forward to six countries claiming the right to 
apply preference law to one pre-bankruptcy payment, with three de­
ciding it was preferential and recoverable and three deciding it was 
not. That result creates large inefficiencies, ex ante and ex post. 
Modified universalism offers a substantial chance of avoiding such re­
sults, because it will often result in a single court resolving such issues. 
Cooperative territorialism does not. Indeed, cooperative territorialism 
not only risks multiple and inconsistent jurisdictional and choice-of­
law decisions, but it is necessarily tied to hopelessly obsolete territorial 
choice-of-law rules.183 
The Maxwell case illustrates these points, because it involved the 
principal problem Professor LoPucki invokes against modified univer-
181. See supra notes 158-164 and accompanying text. 
182. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 38. 
183. See generally Russell J. Weintraub, An Approach to Choice Of Law That Focuses 
On Consequences, 56 ALB. L. REV. 701, 702 (1993); Robert A. Leflar, The Nature of Con­
flicts Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1080 (1981); David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice·of­
Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1933); Brainerd Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudi· 
cation versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205 (1958); Willis L.M. 
Reese, Conflict of Law and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEt>fP. PROBS. 679, 679-
80 (1963) (all criticizing the territorial/vested rights approach to choice of law and expressing 
the view that its time had passed). But cf. Joanna Benjamin, Property Rights in the Financial 
Markets, the Internet and Conflicts of Laws - The Idea of Location, Schmitthoff Conference 
2000: Law and Trade in the 21st century (London, June 1-3, 2000) (abstract; copy on file 
with author) ("In the global weightless economy, the fiction of location serves to simplify the 
conceptual aspects of conflict of laws."); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Ter­
ritorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 
(1992) (arguing for territorial choice-of-law rules within the United States). 
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salism - the difficulty of identifying a debtor's principal place of busi­
ness - as well as the problems his solution exacerbates. In Maxwell, 
the legal saga began when Mr. Maxwell fell or was pushed off his yacht 
in Spanish waters. His troubled empire fell apart in scandal and fraud. 
One of his groups of companies filed for Chapter 11 in the United 
States . and for insolvency administration in the United Kingdom, the 
filings within days of each other. The case was the classroom example 
for Professor LoPucki's concern: the parent's headquarters were in 
London and most of its financing was there, but most of its assets were 
in other countries. Specifically, eighty percent of its assets were in 
companies headquartered in the United States.184 Thus one could 
make a nice argument for either the United States or the United 
Kingdom as the country of the main proceeding for the parent. Be­
cause of these ambiguities at the start, the United States court forged a 
compromise: it refused to dismiss the United States case under section 
304, but de facto deferred to British administration of the case, subject 
to concurrence on key decisions by an examiner appointed to watch 
out for United States interests. This result was a classic application of 
modified universalism, because the administration was centralized in 
the United Kingdom for the most part, but the United States examiner 
was in a position to ensure that United States interests were not com­
promised. 
Maxwell also presented a classic transnational preference problem, 
which the bankruptcy and district courts resolved essentially by defer­
ring to British law and the British courts on a finding that the United 
Kingdom was the center of the case.185 Although the analysis is much 
more complicated in detail,186 that result was squarely consistent with 
the pragmatic, yet centralizing instinct of modified universalism. 
The final result in Maxwell was an agreed plan of liquidation on a 
worldwide basis, apparently the first ever.187 The key point is that the 
courts and the parties were able to take a worldwide view of the case, 
rather than a parochial one. The fact that United States creditors 
would have gotten considerably more money had United States law 
been applied to the preference issue did not deter the United States 
courts from choosing the cooperative result. Had the courts applied 
the "vested rights" views suggested by cooperative territorialism, the 
United States creditors in that case would have done better, but 
United States creditors in the next "n" cases might well have done 
184. It must be noted, however, that these companies - including Random House and 
the Official Airline Guide - in turn had assets all over the world. 
185. In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800, 818 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), 
aff d 186 B.R. 807, 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff d, 93 F.3d 1036, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996). 
186. See Westbrook, Lessons, supra note 160. 
187. See id. 
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worse because of an inability to achieve a fair and acceptable world­
wide result. 
Professor LoPucki might claim Maxwell as a good example for his 
approach, because two parallel proceedings were involved, rather than 
a United States section 304 case ancillary to the British case. Yet 
modified universalism can operate through parallel proceedings and 
that is what happened in Maxwell.188 The reason Maxwell must be 
seen as an application of modified universalism rather than coopera­
tive territorialism is that the rights of the parties were seen from a 
worldwide perspective, rather than as a series of rights vested in each 
territory. Indeed, Professor LoPucki's notion that local creditors are 
somehow cheated of vested rights by a transnational solution to a 
transnational bankruptcy189 lies at the heart of our disagreement.190 
The payments challenged as preferential in Maxwell amounted to 
more than $100 million. Their recovery would thus have increased dis­
tributions to all unsecured creditors by a substantial percentage. Fur­
thermore, if the transferee banks (all of which had substantial opera­
tions in the United States ) had suffered a preference judgment in a 
purely United States proceeding, the United States creditors would 
have done better still.191 Although application of British law would not 
have been impossible had Maxwell been governed by a system of co­
operative territorialism, it seems likely that there would have been an 
overwhelming inclination to apply United States law in a United 
States proceeding governed by a notion of fixed local rights. Instead, 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in that case largely ig­
nored choice-of-law approaches. It affirmed the lower courts primar­
ily to vindicate international cooperation in a case they found to be 
mainly British.192 It seems probable the court would have come to the 
188. An ancillary, deferential approach is better in a system of modified universalism, 
but not essential. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 15. 
189. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 71, at 2217-18 ("injustice to the 
individual creditors [when a court] surrenders . . .  assets") and at 2238 ("change in entitle­
ments"); LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 711-13. 
190. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 35 {General Principle V). 
191. Note, however, that the text is written as if one could meaningfully speak of "a 
United States creditor" \vithout an armload of caveats. In fact, most countries, including the 
United States, permit foreigners to file claims and receive distributions witllout discrimina­
tion. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 34 n.46; Guide to UNCITRAL Model Law, supra 
note 16, at 30. The result is tllat "local" benefits may flow to the more sophisticated multina­
tional creditors at least as much, if not more, as to stereotypical local creditors. The compli­
cations are endless and make the notion of "local" creditors with vested rights even more 
attenuated. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 38; Guide to UNCITRAL Model Law, 
supra note 16, at 459-50. 
192 In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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opposite conclusion under a legal regime focused on territorialism and 
maximizing returns to local creditors.193 
Professor LoPucki's discussion of the experience under section 304 
of the United States Bankruptcy Code illustrates our disagreement. 
Modified universalism is a concept based on section 304 and the cases 
thereunder. Section 304 was primarily the brainchild of that excellent 
scholar and comparativist, Professor Stefan Riesenfeld.194 It was de­
signed to permit United States courts to act in an ancillary role to a 
foreign court when that court was in the home country of the debtor, 
the site of the "main" bankruptcy proceeding involving that debtor.195 
Professor LoPucki's description of the litigation under section 304 
turns the jurisprudence on its head. To a lesser extent, the same thing 
is true of Professor Guzman.196 They emphasize a handful of cases in 
which the United States courts have refused to defer to foreign bank­
ruptcy proceedings in the debtor's home country and largely ignore 
the many cases in which the United States courts have eagerly and en­
thusiastically cooperated with those courts, acting in a truly ancillary 
role.197 In the great majority of cases, the United States courts have 
193. Professor LoPucki, in his Cornell article, would solve the Maxwell case another way 
by claiming that payments that could be traced to U.S. companies would be voided on a 
fraudulent conveyance theory and then, under his proposed treaty, the British courts would 
transfer those assets from the British bankruptcy estate to the United States estate. See 
LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 715-18. There simply is not room in the current dis­
cussion for a full analysis of this suggestion, but it should be noted that the payments in 
Maxwell came primarily from the sale of United States companies, not from the accounts of 
United States companies as such and, in any case, those companies were apparently solvent, 
so it is not clear how fraudulent conveyance law would apply. There are a number of other 
difficulties with the suggested approach that could be part of an interesting exchange on that 
subject alone. 
194. See Riesenfeld, supra note 32. 
195. See id. 
196. See Guzman, supra note 47, at 2185; LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 
71, at 2121. 
197. See, e.g., Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. New Cap Reinsurance Corp., 244 B.R. 209 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); In re Thornhill Global Deposit Fund, Ltd., 245 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2000); Order Appointing Examiner, In re Maxwell Communication Corp., No. 91 B 15741 
(TLB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (BroZinan, J.); Order Confirming Plan, In re Maxwell 
Communication Corp., No. 91-15741 (TLB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) reviewed in In re 
Brierley, 145 B.R. 151 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (describing cooperation in Maxwell Commun­
ications Case); In re Axona lnt'l Credit & Commerce, Ltd., 88 B.R. 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1988), affd, 115 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (avoiding transfers to United States creditors and 
returning proceeds to Hong Kong primary proceeding for distribution); In re Ocana, 151 
B.R. 670 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Rubin, 160 B.R. 269 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re 
Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Haarhuis v. Kunnan Enter., Ltd., 223 B.R. 
252 (D.D.C. 1998); In re Kingscroft Ins. Co., 138 B.R. 121 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992); In re 
Banco de Descuento, 78 B.R. 337 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re Singer, 205 B.R. 355 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Brierley, 145 B.R. 151 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Rukavina, 227 
B.R. 234 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Fracmaster, 237 B.R. 627 (Bankr. E.D. Texas 1999); 
In re Schimmelpenninck, 183 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1999); In re Manning, 236 B.R. 14 (B.A.P. 
9th Cir. 1999); In re Treco, 229 B.R. 280 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd 239 B.R. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999); In re Bird, 222 B.R. 229, 229 B.R. 90 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re lonica, PLC, 241 
B.R. 829, 838 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999). Cf In re YMB Magnex Int'l, Inc., 249 B.R. 402 
2324 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:2276 
steadfastly refused to apply section 304(c) in a narrow and technical 
way, as Professor LoPucki reads it, but have given it a broad and gen­
erous construction.198 For the most part, the cases in which they have 
not deferred to a foreign "main" proceeding have been where they 
felt, rightly or wrongly, that the foreign proceeding was fundamentally 
unfair. 
For example, in the Interpool and Papeleras Reunidas cases, dis­
cussed by Professor LoPucki,199 the United States courts found that the 
foreign laws were inadequate and unfair, respectively.200 Modified 
universalism is "modified" precisely because it permits local courts to 
evaluate foreign law and foreign courts before deferring to a main 
proceeding. In these two cases, the United States courts were very 
likely wrong,201 but their inquiry was legitimate. On the other hand, 
United States courts have more often found foreign law to be ade­
quate and fair and have deferred.202 
By contrast, the court in Toga,203 a widely criticized decision,204 ap­
plied the restrictions of section 304( c) quite literally: if a United States 
creditor would be disadvantaged, then we go it alone territorially. 
That is presumably the result endorsed by Professor LoPucki.205 Ob­
viously, that understanding of section 304 would be squarely contrary 
to its intent to promote international cooperation, because it would 
leave only two possibilities: the case in which the United States credi­
tors all feel they will be better off abroad, in which case no United 
States proceeding is needed or will be brought, or the case in which 
the United States creditors can realize some advantage through a pa­
rochial treatment in the United States courts and are absolutely enti­
tled to it. To put it another way, to understand section 304 as saying 
we only cooperate when it is in our interest to do so (or worse, in the 
interest of every one of "our" creditors )206 is to say we will cooperate 
rarely. Happily, most United States cases have held to the contrary, 
finding that section 304( c) requires only that the foreign law be of the 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000) (following earlier deferral to Canadian receivership, the court follows 
Canadian court in permitting securities litigation to proceed in another court). 
198. See generally Buxbaum, supra note 54, at 57, 69; Westbrook, Theory, supra note 37, 
at 471-73. 
199. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 709-10, 730. 
200. I discuss these cases in detail in Westbrook, Theory, supra note 37, at 471-78. 
201. See id. 
202 See supra note 197. 
203. In re Toga Manufacturing, 28 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983). 
204. See Jn re Ironica PLC, 241 F.R. 829, 838 {Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (collecting authori­
ties critical of the Toga case); see also Westbrook, Theory, supra note 37, at 471-73. 
205. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 30, at 730. 
206. See supra note 191. 
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same sort generally as ours and adequate to the task of managing 
fairly the consequences of the financial distress of the debtor at hand. 
They have generally deferred to a foreign main proceeding, even dis­
missing United States cases that might conflict with a worldwide ad­
ministration,207 except where they had serious doubts about the fair­
ness of the foreign proceeding.208 That description of the section 304 
litigation is consistent with what I have called modified universalism. 
The cases that are discussed by Professors LoPucki and Guzman are 
the exceptions, not the exemplars. 
Not only is modified universalism a better rule here and now, but it 
will be more helpful in the necessary transition to true universalism. It 
seems self-evident that judges who have been engaged in active coop­
eration in every case as required by modified universalism, and who 
have had to evaluate foreign bankruptcy laws in order to determine 
whether to defer to a main proceeding, will develop the precise expe­
rience necessary to inform the crafters of a universalist convention. 
Territorialist judges will cooperate less and conflict with one another 
more, reducing their cooperative experience and their interest in co­
operative solutions. Policymakers cannot be expected to move the 
world in one leap from a highly territorial system to a universal one. 
A gradual development of cooperative experience, agreed protocols,209 
shared distributions,210 and the like will provide the necessary confi­
dence, and knowledge, to permit a universalist regime to be estab­
lished. 
Professor LoPucki's Cornell article has made a real contribution to 
the field by articulating a series of important and interesting questions. 
At the end of the day, however, universalism is the right answer and 
modified universalism is the right bridge from here to there.211 
207. See In re Axona Int. Credit & Co=erce, Ltd., 88 B.R. 597 (Banlcr. S.D.N.Y. 
1988), affd, 115 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (avoiding transfers to United States creditors and 
returning proceeds to Hong Kong primary proceeding for distribution). 
208. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 143, Reporter's Note 68 (U.S. courts deferring 
to Canadian and Mexican courts). Other NAFT A courts have returned the favor. See id. 
209. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at Appendix 3 (exemplary protocols). 
210. See Westbrook, Lessons, supra note 186, at 2535. 
211. Nonetheless, two interesting student notes dismiss the progress so far as hopelessly 
inadequate and demand more far-reaching solutions, although in more or less opposite direc­
tions. Liza Perkins, Note, A Defense of Pure Universalism in Cross-Border Corporate Insol­
vencies, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & POL. 787 (2000) (arguing that the answer is pure univer­
salism); Lore Unt, Note, International Relations and International Insolvency Cooperation: 
Liberalism, Institutionalism, and Transnational Legal Dialogue, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 
1037 (1997) (arguing that the answer is cooperation among decentralized courts in liberal 
states). Unt's writing preceded LoPucki's defense of territorialism, but it would seem she 
would reject it because it is strongly oriented to national states, an orientation she would 
likely regard as regressive. 
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C. Professor Guzman 
Professor Guzman is a thorough-going universalist who is not 
committed to a contractual solution to the international bankruptcy 
problem, so I begin by agreeing with many of the points he makes. 
His article is devoted to efficiency arguments that turn on the reduc­
tion of costs as a function of predictability of result.212 I largely agree 
with those arguments, but I must disagree with him in two respects: 
these arguments are not new to the literature and they have probably 
been overstated. 
I first made the argument that universalism would produce lower 
borrowing costs through greater predictability in 1990.213 In an article 
published in 1991, I asserted "that the increased predictability of the 
results of default [from universalism] would significantly reduce the 
costs of borrowing and other credit for multinationals."214 Others had 
made the argument before me.215 Yet I fear that the efficiency argu­
ment may be overstated. On reflection, I think we have to be cautious 
in claiming too much by way of increased efficiency and decreased 
transaction costs arising from predictability. For one thing, predict­
ability in the legal and operational confusion of general default will 
always be limited.216 For another, unsecured creditors receive so little 
in bankruptcy that even adjusting creditors are unlikely to tailor their 
bargains in material respects because of bankruptcy recoveries.217 
Data218 and expert reports219 combine to suggest that unsecured credi­
tors recover little in liquidations in the United States or anywhere else 
in the world. Therefore, one has to be modest in claiming that the 
bargains made by such creditors would be much affected by variations 
in bankruptcy recoveries.220 
212 See Guzman, supra note 47, at 2181. 
213. My 1990 lecture was published as GLOBAL INSOLVENCIES IN A WORLD OF NATION 
STATES, CURRENT ISSUES IN INSOLVENCY LAW (1991). 
214. See Westbrook, Theory, supra note 37, at 466. 
215. See Nadelmann, Local Priorities, supra note 41. 
216. See text accompanying supra note 48. 
217. See Ronald Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 159, 241-43 (1997). 
218. See Michael J. Herbert & Domenic E. Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond, 
Virginia: The Distribution of Assets in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceedings Closed in 1984-
1987, 22 RICH. L. REV. 303, 315-16 (1988). 
219. See Roy Goode et al., Debtor-Creditor Regimes, in WORLD BANK, BUILDING 
EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS 1, 2-3 (1999). 
220. That is one reason that I am not convinced that the ex ante view of bankruptcy is 
the only important one, as Professor Guzman asserts. See Guzman, supra note 47, at 2186 
n.43. Another is the fact, recently demonstrated again in East Asia, that creditors, even so­
phisticated creditors like the leading money-center commercial and investment banks, regu­
larly make serious errors in risk assessment. 
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Nonetheless, there may be identifiable groups of debtors unlikely 
to grant security. In their general defaults, unsecured creditors might 
do better. One of those groups might be multinational companies. 
Although more empirical study needs to be done, there is some reason 
to think that companies are less likely to grant security as they grow 
larger and more successful.221 The explanation would be that compa­
nies prefer not to submit to the control entailed in granting security 
and therefore resist granting it.222 Multinational companies may be 
larger than most. Therefore, empirical investigation may reveal that 
bargains with multinationals are not as likely to be secured, rendering 
recoveries by the unsecured creditors of multinationals more likely. 
The possibility that multinationals might be less likely to grant security 
may be enhanced by the difficulty of getting valid and enforceable se­
curity interests internationally, making it arguably less likely that mul­
tinational debtors and their creditors would find it worthwhile to bar­
gain for such security. 
If there is a subgroup of firms that are multinational and that do 
not grant security to creditors, international bankruptcy arrangements 
might materially affect the bargains they strike with their unsecured 
creditors, because those creditors might anticipate material differences 
in recoveries in a general default under various possible bankruptcy 
regimes. If so, then international bankruptcy rules might have mate­
rial ex ante effects on the bargains struck by unsecured creditors of 
multinational debtors. Although contractual-bankruptcy arrange­
ments could not effectively be enforced,223 a universalist bankruptcy 
regime that would predictably protect creditors might make possible 
more efficient bargains and better risk-pricing. For example, such a 
regime might provide protection against distressed grants of security 
to secure previously unsecured debts. 
In any case, Professor Guzman's interest is primarily in weakly 
adjusting and non-adjusting creditors.224 Truly involuntary creditors225 
221. See Mann, Secured Credit, supra note 125; see also Michael J. Barclay & Clifford W. 
Smith, Jr., The Priority Structure of Corporate Liabilities, 50 J. FIN. 899 (1995). There may 
be some evidence on this point forthcoming from the Business Bankruptcy Project. See gen­
erally Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses 
in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499 (1999). 
222. See Mann, Secured Credit, supra note 125, at 664-68. The argument is a complex 
one, depending upon the cost to a debtor of losing control of assets as compared with any 
lowering of the cost of borrowing consequent upon the grant of security. See id.; see also 
Henry Hassmann & Reinier Krakaman, Hands-Tying Contracts: Book Publishing, Venture 
Capital Financing, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 628 (1992). 
223. See supra Section III.Al. 
224. Professors Bebchuk and Guzman have also argued that territorialism is actually 
better for countries adopting it, providing incentives for local investment by debtors through 
lower borrowing costs offered by favored local creditors. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Andrew 
T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 775 
(1999). Although this Article is not the occasion to address that contention, I should note 
that I disagree with it. One objection is that their analysis turns on discrimination against 
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are not well-protected under domestic law in most countries and are 
not likely to do well under either territorialism or universalism until 
substantive reforms are made. All adjusting creditors, full to weak, 
will do better under universalism, as Professor Guzman says, although 
not as well as he and I might like, for the reasons just mentioned. Pre­
dictability will reduce risks and costs ex ante to some extent and that 
effect is useful. There are details that would be interesting to pursue, 
but this article is too long already. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most important result of this symposium is that we are 
all found to favor universalism as the long-term solution to general de­
fault by a multinational. Professor Guzman and I seem fairly close to­
gether in looking to a form of universalism as a transitional solution as 
well. Professor Rasmussen's concept of universalism remains focused 
on privatization. He seems not to find much value in transitional solu­
tions short of that. Professor LoPucki remains committed in the near 
term to territorialism mitigated by agreements to cooperate. 
Universalism is the future of international bankruptcy, and the fu­
ture may come sooner than we imagine. No one knows if globalization 
will continue at its current, accelerating pace, but we do know that in 
other fields there are meaningful international legal rules in place to­
day that seemed far-distant ten years ago and would have been almost 
unimaginable ten years before that. If globalization does proceed 
apace, then the pressures for a universal system for managing the fi­
nancial crises of multinational companies will prove irresistible: global 
bankruptcy for a global market. 
foreign creditors. In fact, there is little formal discrimination against foreign creditors in the 
great majority of countries. See ALI Statement, supra note 15, at 34 n.46. It seems unlikely 
that informal discrimination would be consistent enough to affect investment patterns mate­
rially in countries with reasonably reliable judicial systems. (Countries without such systems 
must, of course, be evaluated by investors on an entirely different scale.) Any effect would 
therefore be small. For a different analysis of incentives for territorialism arising in countries 
that believe they can predict that they will be "surplus" countries, see Westbrook, Theory, 
supra note 37, at 465 n.26. 
225. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, As WE 
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 293 (1989). 
Professor LoPucki advanced our concept greatly in his ground-breaking article, Lynn M. 
LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditors Bargain, SO VA. L. REV. 1887 {1994). Professors 
Bebchuk and Fried have refined that concept considerably with their insight about adjusting 
and nonadjusting creditors, although I agree with Professor LoPucki that all creditors are on 
a spectrum from almost-fully-adjusting to completely involuntary and therefore non­
adjusting. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 71. 
